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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The integration of world markets and the penetration
by foreign banks of domestic banking markets are some of
the results of the banking industry globalization.

Globalization has produced

1

significant increase in the

a

number of foreign banks operating in the United states.
Foreign banking in the United States is an important
part of the complete scheme of U.S. banking regulation.
As Professors Macey and Miller observe people assume that

foreign banking operations are just

a

"marginal niche" in

the banking market but the reality is that foreign banks

are a very big business in the U.S." and world wide.

Regulation of foreign bank entry into

a

country'

banking system, and its supervision differ from country to
Patricia Skigen, Seventh Annual Financial Services
Institute, Globalization of banking: Foreign banking in
the United States, 639 PLI/Corp 273, 27 9 198 9 )[ hereinafter
Skiegen]
International banking "has become much more
important for larger U.S. banks in the last generation,
and bigtime international banks have spread globally in
their network of deposit, loan financing and currency
exchange activities." See William Lovett, Banking and
Financial Institutions, 206 1997 [hereinafter Lovett].
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, Banking Law and
Regulation, 2ed., 683 1997 [hereinafter Macey and Miller].
(

.

(

(

)

)

2

country.

These difference are related to internal

policies and ways each country wants to address its

banking industry and economy.

3

This thesis deals with the new banking reality that
the Republic of Panama is confronting with its observance
to the Basle Accord Guidelines
1997,

.

At the beginning of

group of banking experts started to talk about the

a

modernization of the Panamanian banking law.
law is

a

Now the new

reality and its main change is the adoption of

the Basle Accord Capital Standards as part of its new

banking regulations.
The intention of this work is to study the dynamics
of the Basle Accord and U.S.

regulation of banks and to

contrast them with Panama's new legislation, with the

intention of identify how Panama's international banking

relationship and services may be improved.
The second chapter presents an overview of important

banking regulations and basic banking concepts as well as
basic classes and attributions of banks.
The third chapter examines the dual banking system

and compares it with Panama's banking system.

U.S.

fall into one of two categories of chartering:

federal or

banks

Elana Scoler, Foreign bank entry into the United States,
Canada & Mexico: How NAFTA alters the banking laws, 9-SPG
Int'l Practicum 44 1996) [hereinafter Scoler].
(

while Panama does not have

state,

system is

a

dual system.

The dual

very important consideration when foreign

a

banks are planning to start
since

a

a

banking business in the U.S.

bank's jurisdictional charter determines the

system of laws and agencies that are going to govern its
operations

i

Chapter Four examines the basic features of

international banking regulation with special attention
being given to the capital adequacy standards established
by the Basle Accord and the U.S.

regulations of foreign

banks currently engaged or seeking establish banking

operations in the United States.

This chapter describes

the recently signed Basle Accord and its implementing

regulations in the U.S. as well as the BCCI case that

opened regulators eyes to the gaps that still exist in

international banking regulations.

5

Thomas Shelton and James Colter Harris, Banking
Regulation, US/1, November 1995 [hereinafter Shelton].
"The BCCI failure is of great concern because of its
worlwide impact.
Multinational banks such as BCCI
transcended national boundaries to link together the
economies of various countries.
As a result, a
multinational bank, and particularly its solvency, affects
many countries... The lessons learned from BCCI may prevent
future bank failures that may have an even grater
financial impact worldwide." See Donna Edwards, Note, The
bank of Credit and Commerce International Scandal: A
warning for bank regulators, 24 Law & Pol'Int'l Bus.
1267 (1993) [hereinafter Edwards]
.

CHAPTER II
IMPORTANCE OF BANKING REGULATIONS

The international banking business has faced

tremendous opportunity and challenge,
a

and is currently in

stage of continuing development and expansion.

Some of

the changes that the banking industry has experienced are:

rapid advances in communications and computer technology

;

a

substantial rise in the interest rates paid on deposits;

a

significant liberalization of state laws in relation to

bank holding company interstate acquisition of banks; and

Michael Maloy, U.S. International Banking Policy:
Prospects and Problems in a New Millennium, 15 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. 277,
1996) [hereinafter Maloy
"Financial modernization is a nice way of saying that
banking is about to go through a period of change that
will make what has happened in the past look like a slow
crawl." Arnold G. Danielson, How will financial
modernization impact banking in the South, 16 NO. 16
Banking Pol'y Rep. 5 1997 [hereinafter Danielson].
One of the factors that contributes to the globalization
of the banking business is the technological advances in
communications and information exchange.
Globalization
has produced a significant increase in the number of U.S.
offices of foreign banks and their share of the U.S. loan
market.
The increased activities of foreign banks in the
U.S. have produced stronger competition for business and
market share.
See Skigen, supra note 1 at 280.
;

(

(

)

an increase in competition from foreign banks.' It is the

objective of bank regulations to avoid monopolies for

existing banks and to increase competition."

1

Because

maintenance of competition is essential for public
confidence, government regulation is an important element
in the banking area.

An unregulated banking market would

be an easy target of no confidence from the public and

would stimulate bank failures.
Every country'

s

11

legislation is trying to control and

regulate their banking activity in order that depositors
and stockholders may be protected.'

Thus,

the banking

business is subject to strict regulation and supervision
with corrective authority for dangerous practices.

Another important concern of the regulatory

authorities is banks' capital adequacy and the enforcement
of reserve requirements.

1

In the United States and

Panama the two major components of banking regulation are

Arthur Wilmarth, The expansion of state bank powers, the
federal response, and the case for preserving the dual
banking system, 58 Fordtham L. Rev. 1133, 1139
(1990) [hereinafter Wilmarth]
9 Corpus Juris Secundum, Bank and Banking § 2,
(1996)
11

Id.

at 306.

"[BJanking activity remained based in industrial
national systems, governed by national law." Maloy, supra
note 6 at 279.
"Protection of depositors of a Bank and
the investors in shares of bank stock is a proper subject
for statutory regulation."
Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson,
439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977).
See also 1 Bank and
Banking §3 (1986)
Lovett, supra note 1 at 117.
.

the regulation of banks and the regulation of bank holding

companies

14
.

The regulation of banks includes provisions for

federal deposit insurance,

entry requirements, activities

restrictions, minimum capital standards, geographic

restrictions on the location of branches, and lending
limits.'

The bank holding company regulations include

activity restrictions for the nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies, limitation in geographic expansion,
capital adequacy and other requirements.

16

The United States structure of banking regulation has
its intellectual origins in the bank failures of the Great

Depression."

The regulatory response to this situation

was the enactment by Congress of the Federal Deposit

Insurance Act of 1933.
New regulatory policies were created to avoid bank

failures and fraud,

like "entry control, price control,

Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew Rosenfield and Robert
Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
companies, 73 Va L. Rev. 301 302 1 987 [hereinafter
Rosenfield and Stillman]
.

15

,

(

at 301.
at 302.
During the Depression it was assume that bank failures
had been caused by ^excessive competition' during the boom
years of the 1920' s. Bank failures were contagious
because the failure of one bank could undermine the public
confidence in other banks, causing them to fail as well.
10

Id.
Id.

Id.

7

market allocation through the forced separation of
commercial banking from investment banking and securities
activities, and close supervision of investment and

related activities.""
the regulation of the banking business had

In Panama,

its origins in the enactment of the Cabinet Decree 238 of

July

2,

1970. This law created the Panama International

Banking Center
and fifty

1

(150)

",

which embraced at that time one hundred
banks,

an asset total of fifty million

dollars, more job offers and

a

service culture."

1

The

success of the Panama Banking Center has stimulate the

birth of other banking centers in neighboring countries
that now compete with the services offer by Panama."

Because of this new panorama, the Panama Banking

Association is working together on

a

bill with the

Panamanian Government in the amendment of the 1970'

s

law."'

Government protection against market competition through
the entry and price control that would make banks and

other
firms more safe and sound was the "medication" to these
"illness". Id. at 303.
The achievements
reached by the Panama International
Banking Center are the increment of the banking services
in private transactions; the opening of the local
investment market to the international exchange market;
the establishment of a national exchange market and the
development of a growing Banking System. Panama Banking
Association, Centro Financiero, Aho 15 No. 82- Julio/
Agosto, 5 1997 ). [hereinafter Centro Financiero]
(

20
21
22

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1.
at 5.

The new bill is going to have new regulatory elements that
deal with foreign intermediaries and financial instruments
in an effort to attract new sources capital for the direct

investments needed by Panama's economy.
As

a

J

result of global economic integration in the

last two decades involving extensively banking systems

operating abroad, national regulatory entities must have

expanded capacity to supervise banks with operations
beyond their home countries. 2

The Basle Accord seeks such

'

joint supervision between both the home country and host

country regulatory entities looking for what is called
"total supervision"." 5

What is a Bank and Banking Business?

A.

The term "bank" has been defined in many different
but they tend to embrace the same fundamental

terms,
ideas."'

A bank is

a

"moneyed institution, generally

incorporated and of quasi-public character, whose business
it is to receive money on deposit,

cash checks or drafts,

discount commercial paper, and make loans.""
Generally, bank "implies

a

place for the deposit of

money and that is the most obvious purpose and

23
24

25

Id.
Id.
Id.
9

27

at 6.
at 6.

C.J.S. Banks and Banking §

Id.

2,

(1996)

a

primary

function of such an institution
a

" 2:

The FDIC Act

E

defines

bank as "any National Bank, State Bank, and any former

Savings Association that has converted from

Association charter and is

a

a

Savings

Savings Association Insurance

Fund Member." 30

Another definition for bank is as follow:
"the place of business where credits are opened
by the deposits or collection of money or
currency, subject to be paid or to be remitted
upon draft, check, or order; or where money is
advanced on loaned or received for discount or
for sale." 31

Panamanian Cabinet Decree Number 238 set forth the

meaning of bank as "every juridical person engaged in the
banking business, other than the Savings and Loans

Associations authorized according to the laws."'"
Banks are institutions that provide financial
services.

The liquidity services provided to depositors

are some of the services that
to their customers.

a

banking institution offers

Banks also provide some services

through their lending activities.

These institutions

See 10 Am Jur 2d, § 1 (1997
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1933.
30
See 10 Am Jur 2d, § 1 (1997).
31
Tax Comm'n v. Yavapai Country Sav. Bank, 52 Ariz 374, 81
P2d 86.
See also 10 Am Jur 2d., § 1 (1997).
32
Cabinet Decree Number 238 of July 2, 1970.
Whereby the
Banking System is amended and the National Banking
Commission is established.
29

10

assess credit risk and fund and monitor investment
J

projects

The concept of

a

bank as

a

financial intermediary that

offers transaction services refers to the two sides of

bank's balance sheet."

a

The balance sheet for banking

institutions is divided into assets and liabilities in
which demand deposits dominate the liability side of the

balance sheet of most banks.

3

The liabilities side of

a

bank'

s

balance sheet

consists of demand deposits, which includes checking
accounts,

saving accounts

turn-over);

(active turn- over and passive

time deposits, which consist in repurchase

agreement accounts, short-term deposit accounts and mediumterm deposit accounts; debts, to government, Central Bank,
or other financial support for borrowing,

for borrowing;

equity,

to other banks

capital, which includes shareholders

surplus and reserve for contingent liabilities; and

capital loans,

that are special loans to provide bridge

Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 306.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 61.
Banks are distinct from other types of financial
intermediaries in that a high percentage of their
liabilities are liquid, while a high percentage of their
assets, long term commercial loans, are illiquid.
No other
entity combines liquid liabilities with illiquid assets in
the same manner as banks. Id. at 306-07.

LI

financing in anticipation of subsequent sale of additional

shareholder stock to increase capital resources.

3

The assets side consist of reserves, which includes

accounts in reserve banks; other reserve assets

cash;
(e.g.,

Federal bills, notes or bonds,

notes, Municipal notes or bonds,

interest);

State bills, bonds or

and bank accounts earning

liquid assets, which consist of government

securities and corporate securities; physical assets and

miscellaneous, which includes buildings, equipment,
supplies,

leases,

etc.;

and loans, which consist of loan

obligations readily marketable and not readily marketable."'
As a financial intermediary,

the asset side of a bank

focuses on obligations rather than activities that are

directly productive in their own right.

31

A simply model of a bank balance sheet 3

Assets

Deposits

Fixed Rate Mortgages

Lovett,

supra note

is:

Liability/Net

Cash

37

"

1

Equity

at 139.

Id.

Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 61.
The bank does not engage directly in productive activity
but rather provide funds to other enterprises.
It is
capitalized principally through demand deposits.
Id.

The business of U.S. banking,

in essence,

consists of

the following functions:

"the issue of notes payable or demand, intended
to circulate as money where the banks are banks
of issue; in receiving deposits payable on
demand; in discounting commercial paper; making
loans of money or collateral security; buying and
selling bills of exchange; negotiating loans; and
dealing in negotiable securities issued by the
government, state and national, and municipal and
other corporations; or the exercise of any
banking function." "
4

In comparison,

the banking business under the

Panamanian banking law is:

"Primarily the act of obtaining financial
resources from the public through the acceptance
of demand or time deposits of money or through
any other means authorized by the pertinent law;
and the use, an account and the risk of the bank,
of such resources for loans, investments, or any
other transaction authorized by law or banking
practices."

Classification and Attributions of Banks.

B.

Banks are classified as

(1)

banks

of'

deposits; which

include savings banks and all others that receive money on
deposit; and

(2)

banks of discount,

those which loan money

on collateral or by means of discounts of commercial

40

v. Currency Services, 358 Mo. 983, 218 S. W. 2d
See also 10 Am Jur §2.
Any person engaged in the
business carried on by banks of deposits, or of discount,
or of circulation, is doing a banking business, although
but one of those functions is exercised. MacLaren v. State,
141 Wis. 577, 124 N.W. 667; see also People v. Bartrow
(N.Y.), 6 Cow. 290.
See 1 Banks and Banking, §2 1986.
41
Cabinet Decree Number 238 of July 2, 1970.

State

600.

13

paper."'

Banks are also classified as savings banks,

commercial banks and trust companies."'
The principal attributions of
deposits'*

4
,

a

bank are to receive

to issue negotiable notes and to discount notes.

Although it is not necessary to exercise all of these
attributes; generally, banks exercise more than one of
these functions.

4

If a corporation has been granted the

power to do some of these bank attributes, that does not
make it

a

bank.

46

Banks may be banks of deposits or banks of discount,
the
same bank generally performs both of these operations.
9
Bank and Banking, § 3, (1996)
C.J.S.
Id.
A trust company is a bank, however, trust companies
are distinguished from, and are not regarded as, banks
within the commonly accepted concept of the term.
See
First Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank of San Diego v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 2 P. 2d 347, 213 C. 322, 78 A.L.R.
1324.
A distinctive feature of the business of banking is the
receiving of the money of other on deposit.
In the early
years of the banking business, it consisted only of
receiving deposits for safe-keeping.
Even today, a bank is
primarily a place for the deposit of money.
9 C.J.S. Bank
and Banking, § 4 (1996)
A banking institution exercising any one or more of these
functions is a bank in the strictest commercial sense.
Actually, banks are prohibited from issuing circulating
notes. Id.
.

46

Id.

CHAPTER III
THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST WITH THE

BANKING SYSTEM OF PANAMA

One of the biggest differences between the Panama and
U.S. banking system is that the United States has a dual

banking system and Panama has an unitary banking system.
The dual banking system allows

a

bank to be chartered and

supervised by either federal or state authorities.

4

As Geoffrey Miller has observed "the dual banking

system has long been
tradition

" 4i

sacred cow in the American political

a

this system is suffering the

However,

consequences of the rapid evolution of the nation's
financial system.

All the changes that are happening in

Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Banking Law Symposium, Recent
Challenges to the persistent dual banking system, 41 St.
Louis U.L.J. 263, 264
1996 ). [hereinafter Schooner]
Geoffrey Miller, The future of the dual banking system,
53 Book L. Rev. 1, 2(1987). [hereinafter Miller]
(

14

15

the banking industry are going to be reflected in the dual

banking system.
A.

4

"

Historical Facts.
Since the U.S.'s early years,

the federal and state

governments have shared responsibility for the regulation
of banking.

5

Between 1787 and 1836, the state governments

chartered and regulated many banks while the federal
government chartered and regulated only two banks.
1836,

2

state legislatures enacted 'free banking laws'

After
that

were general incorporation laws that permitted any person
to obtain a bank charter upon some conditions."'

Between

1836-1863 the unique chartering authority for banking

49

Id.

Schooner, supra note 47 at 264.
The two banks chartered and regulated by the federal
government were the first Bank of the United States (17911811) and the Second Bank of the United States (1816-1936)
See Wilmarth supra note 9 at 1153. "The approval of the
charter of the first bank of the U.S. was obtained by
Alexander Hamilton over the opposition of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison. In rechartering the Second Bank of the
U.S., President Jackson declared that the bank was
subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to
the liberties of the citizens because it made possible a
concentration of power in the hands of a few men
irresponsible to the people" See Id. at 1256 FN 79.
The 'free banking' laws facilitated the chartering of new
banks and assured the development of a decentralized
banking industry.
Id. at 1153.

16

institutions were the states.

3

In many states "access to

bank charters became more automatic or freely available,

provided that moderate initial capital requirements were
satisfied by the incorporators."'

Each state had their own

policies but the regulator's basic standards were strict
capital requirements, and "enforcing specie

supervision,

convertibility." 3

"

State banks were the subject to failures

because of the laxity in the performance of these

Many state banks suffered frequent runs, and

standards.
this prompted

a

lose of public confidence.

The dual banking system was born by

During the Civil War 57
Act of 1863.

3t

,

56

^accident'

Congress passed the National Bank

The intention was not to create

a

dual

banking system, but to enact stronger federal banking
legislation.

Lovett,
54

55

56

5

The Act's intention was to "provide for

supra note

1

a

at 11

Id.
Id.
Id.

During the Civil War, eleven southern and agrarian states
were out of the Congress. Id. at 12.
"Congress decided to reinstitute a system of national
banks in 1863, choosing the state free banking model
instead of the centralized federal approach of the First
and Second Banks of the United States."
See Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1153.
59

Id.

17

uniform national currency and to help finance the Civil
War."

60

The intention of the Act was not achieved and in 1865

Congress increased federal taxes on state bank notes.
State banks avoided the tax on bank notes by using checking

accounts as

a

substitute.

Thus,

from state to federal charters,

instead of converting

the existing state banks

remained, making the dual banking system

a

reality.

€

'

During the last sixty years, Congress has acted in

manner that has preserved
bank regulation.

a

a

central role for the states in

In the 1930' s,

Congress rejected

proposals that would have eliminated the state banking
system.

Instead "Congress allowed national banks to

establish branches only within their home state and only to
the degree expressly permitted by state law and made

federal deposit insurance available to all state banks."
In the 1950' s,

interstate acquisitions of banks by bank

Schooner, supra note 47 at 265.
"The National Banking
Act of 1863 encouraged federal chartering of states banks
with modest capitalization requirement, but imposed
stronger reserve requirements and limitations on the note
issue of federally chartered banks".
See Lovett, supra
note 1 at 12
Kenneth Scott, The dual banking system: A model of
competition in regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9(1977)
[hereinafter Scott].
Congress attempted, in 1865, to drive
state banks out of business by placing a prohibitive ten
percent tax on their circulating notes.
See Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1153-54.
62
See Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1153-54.
63

Id.

at 1154.

16

holding companies without state authorization was not
allow.

c

In 1933 and 1956,

'

it was determined by Congress

that "state control over bank expansion would preserve

a

decentralized banking industry and prevent the growth of
concentrated financial power.""
B.

Innovations regarding the Dual Banking System.
Since the Civil War,

under

a

the banking industry has operated

system of state and federal regulation.

Banks can

determine the nature of the regulations to which they will
be subject as well as the government agency that exercise

that regulatory function, by selecting one chartering

authority rather than another.

°'

Under the dual banking system it is impossible to

evolve to

a

regulatory monopoly of one banking agency that

would enable the creation and enforcement of

a

"single

The prohibition by Congress of the interstate acquisition
of banks by bank holding companies had the intention of
preserve state control over the expansion of banking
organizations. Id.
Id. "In adopting and amending the McFadden Act in 1927
and 1933, and in passing the Duglas Amendment in 1956,
congressional supporters of state control over bank
branching and interstate bank acquisitions repeatedly
referred to the need for a decentralized banking system."
See Id. At 1256 FN 86; see also Clarke v. Securities Indus.
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 413 (1987).
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 112.
See also Miller,
supra note 48 at 1.
1

19

industrial cartel"

environment of
cartel." 08

a

which implies "banking operated in the

government-sponsored and enforced

Fixing the prices that depository institutions

can pay for deposits,

and dividing markets are the

principal elements of cartel banking.
banking,

Under Cartel

the banking structure is presumed was stable,

and

when combined with the federal deposit insurance, banking
failures are likely to be

a

rare event.

However,

the

resulting banking structure and its regulations are

unlikely to be innovative.
system has produced

a

In contrast,

the dual banking

continuing series of innovations in

bank regulation at both state and federal levels, and
together with federal deposit insurance, made bank failures
a

rare event

'

.

The dual banking system allows states to act as

^laboratories for change' originating "free banking laws,

checking accounts, branch banking, real estate lending,
trust services,

reserve requirements, and deposit

See Kenneth Scott, supra note 61 at 3; see also Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1155. The phrase refers to the fact that
"banking operated in the environment of a governmentsponsored and enforced cartel." See Miller, supra note 48
at 2.
68

Miller, note 48 at 2.
"The division of markets works between depository and
nondepository institutions, and among depository
institutions according to their loan portfolios and
geographic location." Id. at 4.
70

Id.

::

insurance"

All these innovations were later

~
.

incorporated by Congress into the laws governing federal
banks
The banking structure is increasingly becoming more

State banking has embraced the creation of

competitive.

interstate electronic funds transfer

(EFT)

systems through

the establishment of networks of automated teller machines
(ATM's)

72

the initiation of the negotiable order of

;

withdrawal

(NOW)

account concept, which are "savings

accounts which allow the customer to withdraw funds by
means of

a

negotiable instrument"' 3

;

and interstate

acquisition of healthy banks by bank holding companies.'
In the latter,

due to

a

Congress was "unable to adopt legislation

stalemate among competing segments of the banking

industry"''

As a result,

state laws have embraced

interstate acquisition instead of being preempted law.
71

Wilmarth,

72

supra note

9

7

at 1156.

Id. at 1156.
See S.Rep. No. 368, 96 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in
1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 236.
See also Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1256 FN 99. "Congress gave nationwide
authorization for NOW accounts service only after several
states had demonstrated that NOW accounts are highly
desirable to both consumers and banks." Twenty years ago,
several states authorized state-chartered savings banks to
offer NOW accounts.
It was so successful that Congress
gave nationwide authorization for the offering of this
service by all federally-insured depository institutions.
See S. Rep. No. 368 at 5.
Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1156.
75
Id. at 1157.
76

Id.

.

.

Z X

On the other hand,

regulatory innovation has not been

absent on the national-chartered side of the dual banking
In the 1960's,

system.

the Comptroller of the Currency

liberalized chartering policies and lending powers for
national banks with the intention of increasing the

attractiveness of national bank franchises.

He issued

rules authorizing the establishment and operation of

collective investment funds, the underwriting of revenue
bonds,

the operation of insurance and travel agencies and

some other banking services.
the courts,

These rules were reversed by

but it prompted an increase in the conversions

of state-chartered banks to national chartered banks as

well as other innovations by the states and other federal

agencies

See also W. Brown, The dual banking system in the
United States 33-38, 59-66 (1968) [hereinafter Brown]
78
Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1157.
Id.
"Saxon's rulings were ultimately reversed by court
decisions, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. V. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1981) (striking down regulation authorizing national banks
to establish and operate collective investment funds);
Arnold Tours, Inc. V. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1 st Cir
1972) (invalidating ruling permitting national banks to
operate travel agencies); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep.
Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5 th Cir. 1968 )( striking
down interpretative ruling allowing national banks to
operate insurance agencies in towns with a population of
more than 5,000); Port of New York Authority v. Baker,
Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968 )( invalidating
regulation authorizing national banks to underwrite revenue
bonds) ." See Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 123.
Id.

.

)
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Another federal innovation has been the expansion of
the branching powers of federal banks.

The Comptroller of

the Currency held that "national banks should be given the

same branching powers as state-chartered thrift

institutions based on

a

finding that such thrifts are

for purpose of the McFadden Act." 80

'State Banks'

Looking at the safety and soundness of banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991

(FIDICIA)

banking system.

made significant changes affecting the dual
81

FIDICIA amended the FDIC Act "to limit,

with certain exceptions,

the activities and equity

investments of state chartered banks to those permissible
8.
to national banks."

The Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking

and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994

"[bank holding companies]
their home state
deposits)

held that

(IBBEA)

could not acquire

a

bank outside

(state in which they took the most

unless the state in which the target bank was

located permitted the acquisition." 83

12

U.S.C.

§

36

(1988);

see Wilmarth,

supra note

9

at

1159.

See Schooner,
82

supra note 47 at 268.

Id.

"Many of the states (host states) have opted-in on a
reciprocal basis-only allowing banks to branch in that are
located in states which permit banks from the host state to
branch in." See Hal Scott and Phillip Wellons,
International Finance, 4ed ., 140 (1997 [hereinafter Int'l
Finance]
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Another distinctive feature of the dual banking system
is the

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977

"encourage

[s

]

(CRA)

which

institutions to help meet the credit needs of

the local communities in which they are chartered

consistent with the safe and sound operation of such

institutions." 8

'

This Community Reinvestment Act is

considered by banking regulators whenever
institution applies for permission to open
make an acquisition.

banking

a

a

new branch or

8

The importance of state authority in issues of

community reinvestment has also been recognized by
Congress.

In relation with interstate branching the IBBEA

provides that:
"The laws of the host state regarding community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending
and establishment of intrastate branches shall
apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that
state, except- i when Federal law preempts the
application of such State laws to a national
bank; or (ii) when the Comptroller of the
Currency determines that the application of such
State laws would have a discriminatory effect on
the branch in comparison with the effect the
application of such State laws would have with
respect to branches of a banks chartered by the
host state." 86
(

84

86

)

U.S.C. § 2901 (b) (1994
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 140.
Schooner, supra note 47 at 275.
See also 12 U.S.C
12

36(f)

(1)

(1994)

.

14
C.

Justifications and Critics of the dual banking system.
The dual banking system remains

a

vital regulatory

concept within the United States despite critical opinions
of seme policy makers and scholars who view the dual

banking system as an unnecessary and inefficient
structure.

8

Moreover,

recent changes in the banking

environment appear to weaken justifications for its

continued existence.

88
.

It is

believed that state bank

depositors are clearly vulnerable to loses from bank
failure while federal bank depositors are not because of
"the existence of the federal deposit insurance." 8

Despite the above concerns,

state regulation and

supervision remain central to the U.S. banking system.
One of the justifications for the system is that it

stimulates healthy competition between federal and state
regulators.

91

Schooner,
i8

89
90

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 265

That results in a safe and sound banking

supra note 47 at 264

*

.
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system.

9i

It is asserted that such competition allows banks

"to select among differing sets of banking laws and

bureaucratic incentives to tailor regulations in order to
hold onto their system's share of the chartering market."""'
Scholars criticize this justification because the

competitive pressures to bring more banks into

a

federal or

state charter will prompt bank regulators to focus on more

flexibility with regard to regulation matters with regard
to regulator's matters; muting attention to the safety and

soundness element inside of the banking system.

Another justifications for retaining dual regulation
asserts that state regulators are more sensitive to

The justification is based in that "the dual banking
system leads in more efficient regulations because
competition between the state and national regulators
limits the imposition of unnecessarily burdensome
regulations, controls the abuse of discretion by
regulators, and encourages the development of the most
liberal banking powers consistent with the safety and
soundness of the banking system." See Henry Butler and
Jonathan Macey, The Myth of competition in the dual banking
system, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677
1988 [hereinafter Butler
and Macey]
(

Id.

at 684.

Schooner,

supra note 47 at 265.

)

.

.
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community necessities,"

encouraging state banks to be more

responsible for the quality and quantity of services they
offer their customers and thus functioning as

a

laboratory

for the creation of new services and their assimilation

into the banking system.

95

As mentioned before,

the most important weakness of

the dual banking system flows from the competition between

state and federal chartered banks.

creates

a

This competition

laxity in banking controls and endangers bank

safety and soundness.

However,

that suppress such competition.

there are many factors

Professors Butler and

Macey established five forces that prevent regulatory

competition in bank's market:
"(1) the federal government's ability to preempt
state regulations; (2) the federal government's
provision of the only viable deposit insurance
through the Federal deposit Insurance
Corporation- this leaves state banks subject to

"State departments are on the ground.
They know the
bank, they know the management, they know the local
community and they know the trends that are afoot in the
state's economy." Id. at 266.
For a better discussion see
also, James Watt, The dual banking system now more than
ever, Address at the conference of the state Bank
supervisors Annual Meeting and Conference 4 (April 15-18,
1994)
"The dual banking system is created with allowing for
state and local innovation in financial services.
A former
Superintendent of Banks for New York State wrote: 'It is
here that bankers know the needs of their customers, the
products to offer to attract new business.'" Schooner at
266.
See also, Jill Considine, A State's response to the

United States Treasury department proposals to modernize
the nation's banking system, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S244
(1991) [hereinafter Considine]

*

_

:

federal legislation,
f ederal-FDIC regulation;
(3)
which, until recently prevented interstate
banking; (4) the doctrine of "competitive
equality", which limits national banks'
activities to the activities permissible for
state banks; and (5) state "wild card statutes,
which impose national bank regulations on state

banks." 96
They consider the supremacy clause to be the primary force
that suppresses competition, because it enables the federal

government to preempt diversity and impose uniformity

.

At least five
See Schooner, supra note 47 at 267.
distinct forces work to prevent the realization of true
regulatory competition in the market for banks charters.
The fist is the ability of the federal government, through
the supremacy clause, to trump state regulation when doing
Second, as a matter of
so serves its interests
competitive necessity, both state and federal banks must
obtain federally provided deposit insurance, and the FDIC
requires that banks obtaining such insurance comply with
its uniform regulations regardless of contrary provisions
in the laws of individual states.
The third force is the
McFadden Act, which has prevented free interstate banking
and thereby has allowed the segmentation of the nation into
over fifty geographic markets.
The fourth is the
competitive equality doctrine, which requires national
banks so follow state law when establishing branch banks.
This enables state authorities to maintain local cartels
and restricts competition among banks in certain
geographical locations.
The fifth force is the laws
passed by a majority of states that automatically impose
the regulations of national banks on state banks--the socalled 'wild card' statutes.
Thus, even in those
situations in which Congress or the FDIC has refrained from
mandating uniform standards, two additional sets of rules-the competitive equality doctrine and state 'wild card'
statutes reduce competition among regulators in the
provision of banking laws. See Butler and Macey, supra note
91 at 693-94.
97
Butler and Macey, supra note 91 at 717.
.

—

.
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the dual system is criticized for "creating a

Also,

costly system of overlapping regulation""* where state banks
are regulated by both state and federal regulators,

Ironically,

unnecessary costs for some banks."
costly regulation also introduces

a

this

'moral hazard'

virtue of FDIC insurance to state banks.

causing

by

It is believed

that state regulators have less interest in preserving the

safety and soundness of state banks because if the bank
fails the FDIC is in charge and is going to be

responsible
D

.

10C

Regulatory Agencies

.

The agencies that regulate the business of banking in
the United States are the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency,

the Federal Reserve System,

the Federal Insurance

Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Office
of Thrift Supervision,

the National Credit Union

Schooner, supra note 47 at 267.
The overlap is far from being eliminated while federal
and state authorities have made efforts to coordinate
examination and supervision. Id.
The phrase 'moral hazard' is used "to denote a condition
in which the knowledge that a third party will bear the
costs of some harm creates a risk that the actor may fail
to take due precautions against occurrence of the harm.
The deposit insurance system is often said to create moral
hazard on the part of depository institutions by giving
them an incentive to take excessive risks with the
knowledge that the costs of unsuccessful risk-taking will
be borne by the deposit insurance funds, while the benefits
will be captured by the banks." Miller, supra note 48 at
18-19.

.
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Administration, and the State Banking Departments."
Panama,

In

l

the banking industry is actually regulated by the

National Banking Commission.
1.

United States

a

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

.

.

National Banks are chartered through the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).

This office is in

charge of the execution of law related to the issue and

regulation of

a

national currency secured by U.S. bonds and

of all Federal Reserve notes,

with some exceptions.

The

chief of this office is the Comptroller of the Currency
(CC)

who is under the direction and supervision of the

Secretary of the Treasury.

1
'

The Comptroller of the

Currency is appointed by the President, by and with the

Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 66-69.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has
principal supervisory authority over national banks.
It
new
national
issues charters for
banks and supervises the
operations of existing national banks through a corps of
bank examiners.
Id. at 67.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1.
There shall be in the Department of
the Treasury a bureau charged with the execution of all
laws passed by Congress relating to the issue and
regulation of a national currency secured by United States
bonds and, under the general supervision of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, of all Federal
Reserve notes, except for the cancellation and destruction,
and accounting with respect to such cancellation and
destruction, of Federal Reserve notes for circulation, the
chief officer of which bureau shall be called the
Comptroller of the Currency, and shall perform his duties
under the general directions of the Secretary of the

Treasury

30

advice and consent of the Senate, and holds his office for
a

term of five years unless sooner removed by the
upon reasons to be communicated by him to the

President,
Senate.

L

Actually,

the Comptroller has considerable

autonomy from both the President and the Secretary of the
Treasury.

105

The 1994 amendments of the U.S. Code

established that the Secretary of the Treasury is barred
from delaying or preventing the issuance of any rule or the

promulgation of any regulation by the Comptroller.

1

The

Comptroller also has the specific duty to administer the
national banking laws and to supervise national banks. He
also has the power to take possession of the assets of

problem banks and assume control of their operations.

For

the accomplishment of this purposes he can appoint a

receiver.

1
'

In chartering a bank,

the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency states that the proposed bank
must be "operated in safe and sound manner, possess

104

12 U.S.C.A. § 2
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 67.
The Secretary of the Treasury may not delay or prevent
the issuance of any rule or the promulgation of any
regulation by the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 U.S.C.A.

§

1.

The Comptroller of the currency is vested with general
administrative powers and duties even though they may be
judicial in character, for the administration of the
national banking laws, and he is charged with the duty of
supervising national banks, and he has the power to take
possession of the assets of the bank and assume control of
its operations, and for such purposes can appoint a
receiver and place him in complete charge. Id.

31

reasonable prospecis for success and meet the credit needs
of the community."

1Ct

To achieve these goals,

the OCC

considers the following factors when deciding on the
approval of

a

bank application:

bank's future earnings prospects;
general character of its management;
adequacy of its capital structure;
convenience and needs of the community to
A
be served by the bank;
5. the financial history and condition of the
bank; and
6. whether or not it has complied with all the
provisions of the National Bank Act and whether
or not its corporate powers are consistent with
the purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance
1.
2.
3.
.

the
the
the
the

Act.

109

The evolution of the OCC examination process can be

summarized into three phases: prior to the 1980'
the 1980'

s,

to the 1980'

s,

and the current supervisory approach.
s

during

1

Prior

the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

was required to conduct at least three exams every two
years.

The exams were part audit and part review and were

conducted pursuant to general policies and procedures.
During the 1980'

s

1

the OCC conducted bank examinations with

less frequency and without the use of the audit aspect.

Macey and Miller,
109

Id.

supra note

2

at 91-92.

at 92

Robert B. Serino, Supervisory approach of the OCC: bank
fraud, enforcement , and related issues, 640 PLI/Corp
323,326 (1989) [hereinafter Serino].
111

Id.

at 326

2
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The exams were conducted pursuant to specific policies and

procedures using the concept of targeted exams.

11

'"

The CCC examination process primarily focuses on

systematic risk and the prioritization of perceived risks
allowing the use of on-site and off-site analysis."
There are four steps the examiner undertakes in the

"supervision by risk process":

(1)

the identification of

risk using common definitions;

(2)

the measurement and

evaluation of risk based on common evaluation factors;

(3)

the development of a supervisory strategy based on risk and
the performance of the examinations using this strategy;

and

112

113

(4)

Id.
Id.

the documentation of the conclusions and the

supervision by risk has come into
Risk program incorporates the philosophy of
management-driven examinations and continued reliance on
off-site tools to increase our efficiency and minimize
regulatory burden.
It also recognizes that periodic
validations of risk management systems are necessary, as is
drilling down and doing more intense reviews where we see
red flags.
While all of this may sound the same, or at
least similar to our current method of supervision,
supervision by risk does make some important changes: it
adds consistent definitions and a structured process for
examiners to use in assessing risks; its provides an
analytical framework for the OCC to use in deciding where
to focus resources-in individual banks as well as the
industry as a whole; it lays the foundation for the
communication between examiners and bankers to be based on
risk management. See OCC outlines details of new
^supervision by risk' program, Examination Policy, 15 NO.
Banking Pol'y Rep. 5(1996). [hereinafter Examination Policy]
its own.

"In the 1990' s,

33

communication of findings to management and the board.
In addition to these examination of banks,

114

the Comptroller

of the Currency's compliance with these standards and

procedures is assured by his duty to make an annual report
to Congress.
b.

115

Federal Reserve System.
Under the Federal Reserve Act,

the United States has

a

central bank to meet the needs of the U.S. economy and

financial system.

The U.S.

Federal Reserve System (FRS)is

decentralized central bank consisting of

a

12

regional

Federal Reserve banks and their branches that operate under
the supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System in Washington,

D.C.

116

The FRS was established in December 1913 by the

Federal Reserve Act,

and was designed to "rectify the

conditions underlying the recurrent money panics that had

plagued the country for many years."

1

The act has been

amended several times to further the Federal Reserve
System'

s

ability to foster

healthy economy.

1

a

sound financial system and

a

The components of the Federal Reserve

System are The Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve
4

Examination Policy, supra note 113 at 6.
12 U.S.C.A. § 14.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve
System, Structure and Functions, 1 (1992) [hereinafter FRS

115

117
118

Id.
Id.
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Banks,

Federal Open Market Committee and Advisory

Committees

119
.

The Board of Governors

(the Board)

is composed of

seven members that are appointed by the President for 14
year terms, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.

121

The Board performs regulatory functions that

include overseeing the Reserve Banks'

services to

depository institutions as well as bank supervision and,
the establishment of accounting procedures.

also approves each Reserve Bank's budget.

1

1

The Board

The Board of

Governors provides reports to Congress, including an annual
report on operations and semi-annual reports on the state
of the economy and the System's objectives for the growth
of money and credit.

1.

It also sets reserve requirements

for depository institutions and approves discount rate

C.J.S.

§ 650 (1996)
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate... In selecting the members of the Board, not more
than one of whom shall be selected from any one Federal
Reserve District, the President shall have due regard to a
fair representation of the financial, agricultural,
industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical
division of the country.
The members of the Board shall
devote their entire time to the business of the Board and
shall each receive basic compensation at the rate of
$16,000 per annum, payable monthly, together with actual
necessary traveling expenses." 12 U.S.C.A. § 241.
121
FRS, supra note 116 at 3.
9

120

122

Id.
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changes proposed by Reserve Bank directors.""

Finally,

it

is in charge of regulations pertaining to financial safety

and soundness as well as consumer protections."
The Federal Reserve Banks are each separately

incorporated, with

a

Board of nine directors.

Some of

their functions are:
(1) Monitor national and international economic
conditions and provide information on their
Districts that the System needs to formulate
monetary policy; (2) Hold reserve balances for
and serve as lender of last resort to depository
institutions; directors establish the discount
rate charged on such loans, subject to approval
by the Board of Governors; (3) Provide financial
services to depository institutions and the U.S.
Treasury; (4) turn over to the Treasury earnings
in excess of the amount needed to pay expenses
and dividends to member banks, maintain a surplus
equal to its paid-in capital, and pay operating
expenses 12!
.

The Federal Reserve System also exercises the role as
the U.S.

central bank controlling the money supply through

its Open Market Committee.

123
124
125

1,

Finally,

the Federal Reserve

Id.
Id.
Id.

Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 66.
The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) comprises 12 members-the seven
members of the Board of Governors and five Reserve Bank
presidents, one of whom is the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of new York; other presidents serve one-year
terms on a rotating basis; all participate in each meeting
They meet in Washington, D.C. eight times a year.
The
most important instrument of monetary policy are the
directs open market operations.
See. FRB, supra note 116
at

4

.

.
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System has supervision and examination authority over state

chartered member banks.
c.

1,

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(FDIC)

collateral supervising agency for national banks
FDIC regulates,

x

is a

The

'

insures and supervises all state chartered

banks who are not Federal Reserve System members that are

"seeking FDIC insurance protection for their depositors".

1

""

The FDIC was created by Congress when it passed the

Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1933.

independent agency headed by

a

13C

It

is an

board of five directors.

Two of them are the Comptroller of the Currency and the

director of the Office of Thrift Supervision serving ex
officio.

The others are appointed by the President for six

year terms,
Senate.

subject to the advice and consent of the

131

The FDIC

s

primary responsibility is to insure

deposits of all banks authorized by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act to receive insurance.

1

The FDIC

is authorized to terminate the insured status of any member

Lovett,
128

130
131
132

Id.
Id.
12
Id.
Id.

supra note

1

at 119.

See also Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at
U.S.C.A § 1811-1835a.

13:

.
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to initiate

bank;

'cease and desist proceedings'

the banks it insures or regulates;

against

and to suspend or remove

any officer or director of an insured bank.

13

One of the

'

powers not given to the FDIC is the power to close
bank.

a

134

In 1989,

the Financial Institutions Reform,

and Enforcement Act(FIRREA)

Recovery

abolished the Federal Savings

and Loan Insurance Corporation

(FSLIC)

and gave all its

deposit insurance responsibilities to the FDIC.

1

In 1991,

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act

enhanced the FDIC's authority over the resolution of
troubled depository institutions.*
d.

The Federal Home Loan Bank System.
The Federal Home Loan Bank System consists of 12

regional Federal Home Loan Banks, member savings and loan

associations, and
Board.

1

five-member Federal Housing Finance

a

The Federal Housing Finance Board lj

is an

Jeffrey Portis, FDIC'S powers after a bank failure, 65
U.Det. L. Rev. 259
1988 ){ hereinafter Portis] See 12
U.S.C.A. § 1818 (1997)
Portis, supra note 133 at 259.
The power to close a
bank is reserved to the OCC, in the case of s national
bank, and to the appropriate state bank authority, in the
case of a state chartered bank.
12 U.S.C.A § 191 (1997).
"The FSLIC provided federal insurance for most of the
nation's savings and loans and savings banks." Macey and
Miller, supra note 2 at 67-68.
(

136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 68.
12 U.S.C.A.

§

1422a

(a) (1)

.

independent agency in the executive branch of the
The five members of the Federal Housing

Government."

Finance Board are the Secretary of Housing and Urban

Development and four citizens appointed by the President
for seven-year terms,

the Senate.

by and with the advice and consent of

140

The Board of Directors have the power to supervise the

federal home loan banks, which have the function of

placing "long-term funds in the hands of local institutions
in order to

long-term,

[satisfy]

the need of home owners for low-cost,

installment mortgage money and to decrease costs

141
of mortgage money."

e.

The Office of Thrift Supervision.
The OTS was established in 1989 under FIRREA as an

office in the Department of the Treasury.

1

The Cffice of

Thrift Supervision is charged with the supervision and

regulation of the savings and loan industry.''

139

U.S.C.A. § 1422a (a) (2)
U.S.C.A. § 1422a (b) (1)
141
9 C.J.S. § 669
See also Association of Data
(1996)
Processing Service organizations, inc. V. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., C.A. Ohio, 568 F.2d 478.
142
12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a(a)
143
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 68.
12
12

.

.

.

.

.

.
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The National Credit Union Administration.

f

The National Credit Union Administration was created
by Congress'

enactment of the Federal Credit Union Act 14

with the purpose "to establish

'

system of credit unions to

a

facilitate the stabilization of the nation's credit
structure,

loans." 14

"

and to achieve an increased availability of
The NCUA'

s

function is to charter and supervise

federal credit unions and to provide federal deposit

insurance for national and qualified state-chartered credit
unions through the National Credit Union Share Insurance
Fund.
g.

146

State Regulators.

Responsibility for the regulation, supervision and
examination of the state chartered commercial banks,
savings and loans,

savings banks, and credit unions is

vested in the State Banking Department for each state.
2

.

a.

Panama

National Banking Commission.
As already mentioned,

banking system.

144

145

147

Panama does not have

a

dual

The National Banking Commission is the

12 U.S.C.A. § 1751 et seq.
10 Am.Jur. 2d § 73 (1997).

Macey and Miller, supra note
Lovett, supra note 1 at 119.

2

at

6i
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unique banking regulatory agency.

14

It was

'

created by the

enactment of the Cabinet Decree No. 238 Of July

2,

1970.

The Cabinet Decree established that no person shall engage
in the banking business in the Republic of Panama without

previously having obtained the proper authorization from
the Commission.

14
'

the National Banking

However,

Association is charged with

1)

the insurance of the

solidity and efficiency of the Panama banking system,

2)

the promotion of appropriate monetary and credit conditions
in Panama's banking business,

and

3)

the promotion of

adequate conditions for the development of the banking
industry in Panama.'
In Panama's new banking bill,

the National Banking

Commission has complete financial autonomy.

The

institutions it regulates can not be part of the regulatory
agency and can not take part in its decision-making process
with regard to regulatory standards that will affect the

The National Banking Commission is created and assigned
to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy. Cabinet
Decree 238, art. 3.
U9 See Panama Cabinet Decree 238 of July
1970.
2,

Article 4 - The Commission shall have the following
objectives: a) to insure that the solidity and efficiency
of the banking system is maintained so as to promote
monetary and credit conditions conductive to the stability
and sustained growth of the national economy; b) to
strength and promote the proper conditions for the
development of Panama as an international financial center.
See Panama Cabinet Decree 238 of July 2, 1970.

;

banking system nor with regard to the approval, suspension
or intervention of the banking institutions

151

Centro Financiero,

supra note 19 at

9

151

l

CHAPTER IV
BASIC REGULATORY ASPECTS

Competition between banks in many of their activities
has mutted by protectionism regulation.

1

After an

institution has been chartered and legally constituted to
do business as a bank,

it must face the reality of the

limits of its power and the regulatory patterns that it

must follow.

153
.

The three most important the federal

banking agencies in charge of the supervision and

examination of U.S. banks are the Federal Reserve System,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

They along with the

State Banking Department or Commissions are "the major

regulatory agencies for bank market regulation." 1
For certain aspects of banking institutions,

4

the

Depository Institutions Deregulation Commission (DIDC)

1

and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

Lovett, supra note 1 at 117.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 123.
54
Lovett, supra note 1 at 119.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation Commission was
created by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980. Id. at 119 et seq.

42

.

43

(FFIEC)

also have some regulatory and supervisory authority

regarding particular banking institutions.
In Panama,

156

the regulatory and supervisory authority is

the National Banking Commission,

which receives some

assistance from the Banking Association of Panama and the
Executive Body of Panama.

Similar to United States

regulatory procedures, the National Banking Commission
requires each applicant for

a

bank charter to file an

application form. The application must be supported with
the plan of operations of the future bank,

description of

a

earning prospects, some information management
capabilities, adequate capitalization and soundness, and
their plan to serve the community needs.
A.

15

Safety and Soundness of the Banking System.
The banking industry requires special regulation to

maintain its safety and soundness.

The banking sector

provides products and services to the community which in
turn,

156

have significant effects in the economy.

Id.
Id.

151

at 123.
See also Agreement No. 4-81 of the National
Banking Commission (1981), modified by Agreement No. 19-89
and 17-89 of the National Banking Commission 198 9)
158
Malloy, supra note 6 at 281.
(

.
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Public confidence is

banking business.

15S

a

very important element in the

It is difficult to keep a balance

between competitiveness and safety and soundness because

competitiveness involves risky operations, and safety and
soundness are major factors that maintain public
confidence.

1

For example,

'

other markets,

if a bank wants to compete in

it must expand the range of risk they

undertake, but to maintain the public confidence banks must

retain the confidence of the broad retail market that
serves as its basic source of funding.

161

One of the basic criteria for risk analysis and

assessment of minimum requirements for the granting of
banking licenses under the Panama National Banking

Commission is the financial situation, which is divided
into stability,

soundness,

importance and strength.

1

Under stability and soundness the petitioner bank or its

promoter must not have undergone repeated and severe
financial problems; the bank's history must reflect the
59

Banks "can only operate effectively to the extent that
they retain the credit of the community in which they
operate." Id. at 282.
Kenneth Gordon, Notes and Comments, Risk-Based capital
requirements the proper approach to safe and sound
banking? , 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 491,
512 (1991) [hereinafter Gordon]
"If a bank's depositor do not maintain confidence in the
bank, the risk of deposit volatility and bank runs
increase." Id.
162
Agreement No. 4-81, article 1 § 1(a) (1981); Agreement
No. 19-89, article 1 § 1(b), dated December 13 th
1989.
:

,
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gradual and constant achievement of new and better levels
of financial capability.

16 '

Under the importance and

strength criteria, the petitioner bank must have

a

real

established, well-known and recognized prestige in its area
of origin and development that will be appraised on the

basis of indicators such as, profitability, growth,

performance and equity, assets and deposits risks, as well
as other indicators established by the Commission deemed

adequate and pertinent to such purposes/ 64
Safety and soundness regulation is intended to avoid
bank failures, control risks, and ensure adequate capital.
1.

Capital Adequacy:

Adequate capital is an important requirement to

maintain the safety and soundness in the international
competitive banking system.

1
'

bank capital

In the past,

"Articulo 1-... A. Estabilidad y Solidez: Desde el inicio
de sus operaciones el banco solicitante o promotor no debe
haber tenido repetidos y graves reveses f inancieros
Por
el contrario, la historia del banco debe reflejar el logro
gradual y constante de nuevos y mejores niveles de
capacidad financiera. Agreement No. 4-81, article 1 §
.

1(a) (1981)

.

64

"Articulo 1-...B. Importancia y Fortaleza: El banco
solicitante debe tener una real y reconocida importancia en
el ambiente en que tiene origen y desarrollo.
Esta se
apreciara en funcion de los indicadores de rentabilidad,
crecimiento, eficiencia y riesgo sobre su patrimonio, sus
activos totales y sus depositos totales, u otros
indicadores establecidos por la Comision que resulten
adecuados y pertinentes a tales propositos. Agreement No.
19-89, article 1 § 1(b), dated December 13 th
1989.
165
Malloy, supra note 6 at 283.
,

.
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was used as a "regulatory tool" 1

'

'

but now is being viewed

as the main response to the bank failures of the 1980' s.

Capital is considered

a

'

"financial cushion" that can

contain an institution's losses.''
a

1

Bank capital serves as

source of funds for the acquisition of physical assets.'""
Banks must maintain

a

specific capital reserve in

relation to the risk level of its activities.

In the U.S.

the three primary federal banking regulators have agreed on

166

Gordon, supra note 160 at 491.
See Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards A legitimate
regulatory concern for prudential supervision on banking
activities, 49 Ohio, St. L.J. 1299 (1989) [hereinafter
Norton]
Permanence, subordination and the ability to absorb
losses are the must important characteristics of capital.
Gordon, supra note 160 at 492.
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency stated that Bank
capital "allows a bank to gain competitive entry by
acquiring the necessary infrastructure to operate.
It
provides a cushion to withstand abnormal losses not covered
by current earnings, enabling the bank to regain
equilibrium and re-establish a normal earnings pattern."
Bank capital maintain "the confidence of public lenders in
the bank' s ability to meet maturing demands in most market
conditions,
to sustain present and contemplated growth
patterns and to conform to industry standards." See E.
Gardner, Capital Adequacy and Banking Supervision 7 (Bangor
Occasional Papers in Economics No. 19, 1981) [hereinafter
Gardner]
see also Duncan Alford, Basle Committee
International Capital Adequacy Standards Analysis and
implications for the banking industry, 10 Dick. J. Int'l L.
189, 191 (1992) [hereinafter Alford]
:

;

:

:

.
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a

"risk-based capital adequacy system".

170

It is a

requirement for the banking institutions to maintain

a

Federal insured depository

minimum capital standard.

institutions must comply with two capital standards set by
regulators
leverage limit, which measures an institution's
capital as a percentage of its total assets not
adjusted for risk; and
b) a risk-based capital requirement, which
measures the institution' s capital as a
percentage of its risk-weighted assets. 171
a)

If an institution falls below the

standards,

minimum capital

it is the responsibility of federal banking

agencies and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
take corrective actions.

1

But if the institution falls

'

below the "critical capital level", regulators must control
the situation or seize and close the institution by

appointing

a

conservator in the first case and

in the second case.

a

receiver

173

"Recent changes in the federal banking laws explicitly
authorize, and in some cases require, the federal banking
agencies to intervene promptly in the operations of a bank
that is inadequately capitalized."
See Isaac Lustgarten,
New capital adequacy requirements for banks 9/16/92 W.L.
2507688 R.B.F.S. (1992) [hereinafter Lustgasten]
171
172

Id.
12 U.S.C.

Some of the corrective
§ 1831 (n) (1994)
actions are changes in management, removal of officers and
directors, restrictions on growth, suspension of dividends,
and/or a plan to increase capital. See Lovett, supra note 1
.

at 131.

The appointment of a receivership happens in cases when
the bank stays below the "critical capital level" for more
than a year. Lovett, supra note 1 at 131.
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a.

Background.
From the early twentieth century until World War II

bank regulators measured capital adequacy with

deposits ratio.

capital-to

a

The adequate capital ratio was 10%.

'

employed

After the war, U.S. regulators

(FDIC and FRS

capital-to-totai-asset ratio.

This capital-to-total-assets

)

a

measure failed because it was an "unsophisticated measure
of a bank's financial position;

bank'

s

the relative riskiness of

a

activities was not considered in determining the

appropriate capital position of an institution."
In the late 1940' s,

1
"

the office of the Comptroller of

attempted to adjust the measurement for

the Currency

(OCC)

risk using

capital to risk-adjusted assets measure.

a

17 '

Risk-adjusted assets were calculated by subtracting cash,
bank balances and U.S. government securities from total
assets.

1 ''

In 1952,

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

calculated minimum bank capital by breaking down risky
174

Alford, supra note 169 at 194.
"The capital-to-deposit
ratio was used until World War II when bank deposits
expanded rapidly as a result of bank purchases of
government securities issue to finance the war effort."
See also Gordon, supra note 160 an 493.
An example of why this measure is consider
unsophisticated would be that "two banks with an equal
amount of assets had to maintain equal capital, even though
one of the banks had eighty percent of its assets in cash
and the second bank had its assets in risky commercial
loans." Gordon, supra note 160 at 494.
176
Alford, supra note 169 at 194.
Id.
Cash, bank balances and U.S. government securities
carried no risk of loss.
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assets into six risk weight categories.

1

It assigned a

'

"capital requirement percentage to each category and the
assets in each group were then multiplied by the risk

percentage" 17

"

1

having as

a

result the amount of capital

a

bank was required to maintain.
The ABC formula 180 was developed by the Federal Reserve

Board of Governors, in 1956, but it was abandoned because
it demanded excessive capital.

early 1970'

s,

181

In the late 1960's and

the OCC regulators moved away from using

capital adequacy ratios and decided to consider selected
factors on

a

case-by-case analysis.

They concluded that

the capital adequacy focus did not incorporate all the

factors determinative of the soundness of

a

financial

institution were not consider and therefore it was not
accurate enough.

182

Management quality, assets liquidity, history of
earnings and its retention thereof, quality and character
of ownership,

178

deposit volatility, quality of operating

Id.

179

Gordon, supra note 160 at 494.
"The ABC formula combined a capital adequacy test and
liquidity test in determining the required level of
capital." See Alford, supra note 169 at 222.
181
Banks were required to maintain excessive levels of
capital under this formula.
Id.
Bank capital is only one of the several necessary
factors to consider to keep the soundness of the banking
institution. Gordon, supra note 160 at 495.

a

s

:

5

procedures, and the bank's competitive position were some
of the elements that the OCC used in evaluating a bank'

financial position.

183

In the late 1970' s,

the OCC,

FDIC

and FRS used "peer group comparisons of various ratios" to

determine capital adequacy.

184

The ratios regulators used

equity capital/total assets, total capital/total

were:

assets,

loans/total capital,

fixed assets/total capital,

classified assets/total capital, and asset growth
rate/capital growth rate.

185

This comparison of various ratios become part of the

CAMEL scheme of regulation.

CAMEL is the acronym for the

five elements emphasized under the Uniform Interagency Bank

Rating System formalized in 1979:

183
184
185

Id.
Id.
Id.

(C)

capital adequacy,

18 ^

at 496.

The capital adequacy is "rated in relation to the volume
of risk assets; the volume of marginal and inferior quality
assets; bank growth experience, plans and prospects; and
the strength of management.
Consideration should also be
given to a bank's capital ratios relative to its peer
group, its earnings retention and its access to capital
markets or other appropriate sources of financial
assistance." See Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 563.

.
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(A)

assets quality,

187

earnings performance,

(M)
18

"

management ability,

(L)

liquidity.

190

(FFIEC)

Each bank regulator

developed an uniform rating system.

five,

(E)

The Federal

Financial Institutions Examination Council

uses the same general framework.

188

On

a

scale of one to

banks are rated in relation to each of CAMEL

elements.

The first level is the highest and applies to

The asset quality is "rated in relation to the level,
distribution and severity of classified assets; the level
and distribution of nonaccrual and reduced rate assets; the
adequacy of valuation reserves; and management's
demonstrated ability to administer and collect problem
credits.
Adequate valuation reserves and a proven
capacity to police and collect problem loans clearly
mitigate to some degree the weaknesses inherent in a given
level of classified assets.
Asset quality evaluation
take
into
consideration
any undue degree of
should also
concentration of credits or investment, the nature and
volume of special mention classifications, and the adequacy
of lending policies and credit administration procedures."
Id.
188

Management is rated "in relation to technical
competence; leadership and administrative ability;
compliance with banking regulation and statutes; ability to
plan and respond to changing circumstances; adequacy of and
compliance with internal policies; and depth and
succession." Id.
Earnings are rated "with respect to the ability to cover
losses and provide for adequate capital; earnings trends;
peer group comparison; the quality and composition of net
income; and the degree of reliance on interest-sensitive
funds." Id.
Liquidity is rated "in relation to the volatility of
deposits; the frequency and level of borrowings; technical
competence relative to structure of liabilities;
availability of assets readily convertible into cash; and
access to money markets or other ready sources of funds
Id.

.
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banks that show soundness in almost every aspect of its

structure.

The second rating involves soundness that may

have to make

a

few corrections in weak areas.

The

remaining three levels reflect what is consider to be

problem bank.

1*1

Category three represents

a

a

moderate to

unsatisfactory weakness and "only normally resistant to
adverse business conditions." 192

The level four shows

asset weakness and an unsatisfactory combination of

elements that are consider two steps before failure.

The

lowest rating of five reflects an almost imminent failure

with an urgent necessity of supervision.
In the early 1980' s,

193

low capital levels were

considered an unsafe and unsound practice under the OCC
regulation.

the Fifth Circuit decision,

In 1983,

National bank of Bellaire
held that

a

v.

Comptroller of the Currency 194

low level of bank capital was not necessarily

an unsafe and unsound practice;

191

Lovett,

192

Id.
Id.

193
94

First

supra note

1

and the OCC did not have

at 141-142.

First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 607 F.2d 674 (5 th Cir. 1985).
This case law
undermined the OCC regulatory authority over capital
directives

53

authority to determine the capital level.

1

The

response of Congress to this Court decision was the

enactment of the International Lending Supervision Act of
which concluded that the maintenance of low capital

1983,

levels was an unsafe and unsound banking practice as well
as overturned the Bellaire

decision.
Board,

196

In the early 1980'

s

the Federal Reserve

FDIC and OCC, promulgated capital standards for

domestic banks based on

a

total capital to assets.

197

bank's ratios of primary and

Capital standards became

a

very important regulatory

objective for the banking business.

The Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Insurance

Corporation and the Federal Reserve System agreed, in 1985,
on equivalent capital guidelines for banks' with an uniform

capital composition's definition and minimum capital levels
as well as revised enforcement procedures.

195

196

198

Id.

Alford, supra note 169 at 195.
Skigen, supra note 1 at 298.
The OCC, FDIC and FRS realized that it was necessary to
keep an uniform capital standards considering the
International Lending Supervision Act importance of capital
regulation.
See Gordon, supra note 160 at 500.
197

.

54

In the late 1980'
In 1987,

s

a

number of banks began to fail.

19S

the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England agreed

on the implementation of a common risk-based capital

standard for banks in their respective countries."

Later

regulators from twelve major banking

in the same year,

nations 201 agreed jointly to strengthen capital requirements
to 7.25 percent of total "risk assets" by 1990,

and to

8

percent by 1992. 202
By the time that the Basle Accord was been created,
the banking situation in Panama was critical.

living through

a

Panama was

banking crisis that affected Panama's

economy and its reputation as an International Financial
Center
In 1989,

after the new risk based capital requirements

were promulgated in U.S.,

the OCC,

FDIC and FRS adopted

identical risk-based capital standards based on the Basle

"During 1981-1992 bank failures became more frequent,
including Continental-Illinois, that technically was not
allowed to fail because it was the 7 th largest United States
commercial bank in 1983-84 with $42 billion in assets."
See Lovett, supra note 1 at 138.
"The Accord was intended as a basis for consultation
between the two countries, with the goal of promoting of
capital adequacy requirements among money center banks."
Gordon, supra note 160 at 503.
United States, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany,
Switzerland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Sweden are the twelve regulatory major
banking nations.
Lovett, supra note 1 at 130.

.
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Committee framework/

The Accord was extended in 1989 to

several non-GlO European Union countries when they adopted
their Own Funds Directive based on the Basle Accord

framework.

204

adopted on

a

The Basle Accord Standards continued to be

country by country basis after 1992."°'

The Panamanian legislation follow the paid-in-

capital/deposits as

formula for capital standards.

a

formula adopted assumes that each bank must have

capital and
assets.

paid-in-

capital reserve in proportion with bank

a

Law 101 of 1941 required paid-in capital of only

one quarter of
1970,

a

The

a

million Balboas

(B/

with Cabinet Decree No. 238,

.

250 000 00
,

.

)

but in

the paid-in capital and

reserves capital requirements changed."

1

Article 30 of

the Decree established that every bank in banking business
in Panama 20

must have

a

paid-in capital of an assigned

capital that may be not less than one million Balboas
203

Id.

VII International Conference of the
International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, The
Competitive implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39
St. Louis U.L.J. 885
The non1995 [hereinafter H.Scott].
G10 European Union countries that were also covered by the
Accord were Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Hal S.

Scott,

(

)

Id.

In August

Brazil's Central Bank adopted the Basle
Accord.
See Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 274.
Law 101 of 1941, Republic of Panama.
See Cabinet
Decree No. 238 of 1970, see also Hipolito Jose Maria
Porras, Banking Law, 33 (1981) [hereinafter Porras]
2 07
Only banks with general license can be engage in banking
business both within or outside of Panama.
Cabinet Decree
238 of 1970, article 30.
1994,

.

.
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B/. 1, 000, 000.00)

208

The paid-in-assigned capital must

consist of assets free from encumbrances,

kept at all times

within the Republic of Panama/
Banks with an international license^
all times in Panama,

'

must maintain at

in assets free from encumbrances,

sum of not less than one half of

500,000.00)

1

a

million Balboas

a

(B/.

in order to guarantee that its obligations will

be fully met.

211

operations with

million Balboas

However, national banks may start
a

paid-in capital of only one quarter of

(B/

.

250, 000 00
.

212
)

a

That capital must be

increased periodically up to the minimum capital standard
of one million Balboas

period of ten years.

213

(B/

.

1

,

000, 000 00)
.

within

a

maximum

With regard to the capital reserve,

the Panamanian legislation held that every bank engaging in

The Balboa, at par with the U.S. dollar is the official
monetary unit in Panama. While coins are minted in all
denominations, Panama has no paper currency of its own and
the U.S. dollar circulates freely.
209

Id.

International license is offered for banks "organized
according to Panamanian laws and engaged exclusively in
banking business, from an office established in Panama,
which are completed, accomplished or are intended to take
effect outside of Panama." Id. at art. 16.
211

Id.

National banks are every bank organized according to
Panamanian laws, a seventy-five percent (75%) at least, of
its shares is owned by natural persons who are citizens of
Panama or foreigners with more than five years of
continuous residence in Panama. Id. at art. 17.
213
Id. at article 30, paragraph 2.
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4
the banking business in Panama 2 ' must maintain a capital

reserve,

so that its paid-in-capital,

plus its capital reserve,

percent

(5%)

as the case may be,

is at no time less than five

of its productive assets.

215

In order to promote and favor the participation of

national capital in Panama's International Financial
Center,

the capital adequacy criteria set forth by Panama

legislation with regard to Panamanian banks is applied in
flexible manner. 216

Panama uses

a

a

mechanism similar to

CAMEL as the basic criteria assessing the minimum

requirements for granting banking licenses as well as
supervision.

^

It looks at the financial situation of the

14

The only banks that are engage in the banking business
in the Republic of Panama are the banks with general
license.
General license "shall be issued to banks
organized under Panamanian laws and to authorized branches
of banks organized under foreign laws to engage in banking
business both within or outside of Panama."
Id. at article
16.
215

Agreement No. 1-82 dated July 14,1982.
Participation of Panamanian banks in the development of
Panama as an International Center as well as the
distribution of its benefits, is desirable for national
growth and development. Agreement No. 17-89 dated October

?

1

6

31

st
,

1991.

.

,

.
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bank,^' the composition of bank capital, the administrative

structure and policy used by each bank and its management
qualities
The 1997 Bill for the Banking System Modernization

refers to the United States CAMEL mechanism as one of the

systems that world class banking jurisdictions use to

supervise banking qualification." 18

This suggests that the

supervisory standards that CAMEL system offers should be
used as

a

model for Panama banking regulatory and

supervisory policies.
b.

The Basle Accord.
One of the most significant efforts at world wide

cooperation in supervising international banks was the
creation of the Basle Committee in 1974 under the auspices
of the Bank for International Settlements

(BIS)

.

The most

notable formal result of this Committee's work is the Basle
Accord.

219

The concern over bank capital adequacy, mainly for

banks operating at the international level, prompted

a

In a specific month of the year all banks have to show
in a local newspaper its last year balance sheet.
218
Panama Banking Association, Bill to Modernize the
Banking System, art. 39, numeral 3 (1997) [hereinafter The
Bill]
Cecelia Calaby, Note, The Basle Accord: An opportunity
.

for expanding bank holding company securities activities?
Wash. J. Int'l & Econ. 531, 555-56 (1989)
[hereinafter Calaby]

23 Geo.
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global push for protective measures""" that culminated with
the signing of the Basle Accord in July of 1988.

objectives of the Basle Accord are:

(1)

The

to increase the

safety and soundness of international banks;"

1

and

to

(2)

make the competitive playing field more even for

international banks. "^

The Basle Accord sets out capital

guidelines focusing on the regulation of credit risk and,
The guidelines

secondarily, country transfer risk."'

comprise four principal components:

a

bank capital

definition, an assets and off-balance sheet items system to

estimate the risk category,

achievement of

a

a

basic schedule for the

minimum risk based capital standard, and

phase-in period for the transition to this standards.

a

'

The common international definition of bank capital is
that bank capital is divided in two tiers:- tier

1

capital

"Capital adequacy alone is nor sufficient to avoid bank
failure but is a good start point for international
supervisory cooperation." Id. at 558.
"Countries are concerned with the failure of foreign
banks.
Host countries are concerned that local depositors
in branches of foreign banks could lose money, even if the
host countries do not insure the deposits. Also, the
failure of a large foreign bank with placements from, or
settlement obligations to, other large banks could cause an
international chain reaction of bank failures.
Capital
adequacy requirements are intended to reduce the
possibilities of such failures." H. Scott, supra note 204
at 886.

The elimination of the competitive advantage from higher
leverage ratios make the competitive playing field more
even for international banks. Id.
223
Alford, supra note 169 at 196.
224
See Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 265.
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or core capital that is "basically tangible equity""'

tier

2

or supplementary capital that includes some hybrid

debt-equity instruments and certain reserves.""
contains specific banking instruments."

category all bank assets are assigned to

26
I

H. Scott,
Id.

Each tier

In the framework

for assigning assets and off-balance sheet items

225

and

a

a

risk

risk-weight

supra note 204 at 885.

"The guidelines comprise as one of its basic elements a
common international definition of bank capital dividing it
into two components: tier 1 capital or core capital and
tier 2 capital or supplementary capital.
Tier 1, which
must represent at least fifty percent of total capital,
consists of common stockholders equity, qualifying
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority
interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.
Tier 2, consist of perpetual preferred stock, hybrid
(debt/equity) capital securities, allowance for loan losses
and subordinated debt and intermediate preferred stock.
Goodwill, that represents the excess of the consideration
paid for an entity over its fair market value, is deducted
from core capital.
Certain unconsolidated investments in
banking and finance and reciprocal holdings of capital
instruments are deducted from total capital." See Int'l
Finance at 265, see also Gordon, supra note 160 at 504.

,
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category to calculate the level of risk involved in
specific activity. 228

228

a

The basic theory about risk weight

The risk weight percentage categories are as follow:
Cero percent (0%) category that includes cash, guaranteed
obligations of central banks and governments, and
securities. See Lovett, supra note 1 at 128. This category
It is
does not requires any capital to be maintained.
presumed that these assets have no risk. Gordon at 505.
Ten percent (10%) category may be used for claims or
"This category may be
domestic public sector entities.
used under national authorities discretion." See Alford,
supra note 169 at 199. Twenty percent (20%) risk assets
category contains cash items in the process of collection,
claims or public sector entities in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
claims or multilateral development banks, short-term claims
guaranteed by non-OECD banks and claims on OECD banks or
guaranteed by OECD banks regardless of maturity.
See
Alford, supra note 169 at 199, see also Gordon, supra note
160 at 505.
The fifty percent (50%) risk classification
contains residential mortgage loans and certain privatelyissued mortgage- backed securities representing indirect
ownership of such loans. See Gordon, supra note 160 at 505.
The hundred percent (100%) group includes all other claims
or private obligators, claims on, or guaranteed by, nonOECD foreign banks with a remaining maturity exceeding one
year, claims or commercial firms owned by a government and
all other assets, including any intangible assets that are
not deducted from capital. The members of the OECD are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungry, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
new Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, turkey, United kingdom and United States. See
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 271.
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"The risk-based system requires a certain percentage of
capital to be set aside depending of the level sf ri
involved in the particular activity.
The more risky the
activity, the higher the risk weight, and thus, the more
capital the institution must maintain." Gordon, supra note
160 at 504-505.
Off-balance sheet items are obligations of banks sr.es
may or may not be called, such as bank guarantees. Int'l
Finance, supra note 33 at 273.
Alford, supra note 169 at 199.
"Weights assigned to
off-balance sheet items are determianted through a
conversion formula that translates off-balance sheet
exposures into a rough on-balance sheet equivalent." See
Joint News release from CCC , FDIC, and FR3 re proposed
risk-based capital framework for banks, and bank holdir.j
companies, Capital Adequacy for banks and thrifts, 414
PLI/Comm 7, 10 (1987) [hereinafter Joint News].
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for the risk associated with these non-traditional

services

232

A schedule was established for achieving,

that the end of 1990,

a

by no later

minimum ratio of total capital-to-

risk-weighted assets of 7.25%, and by no later than the end
of 1992,

a

ratio of 8%.

A phase-in period permits banking

institutions to include some tier
capital on

2

elements in core

temporary basis and to provide time to bring

a

their capital position into full conformity with the

capital adequacy standards

"J

"

.

the capital adequacy ratio of a bank is

In sum,

calculated by adding the tier

1

and tier

2

capital amounts

minus the appropriate deductions, and dividing it by the

c32

Within the 100% conversion category are included any
direct credit substitutes, risk participation in bankers
acceptances or direct credit substitutes, sale and
repurchase agreements and assets sold with recourse that
are not included on the balance sheet, forward agreements
to purchase assets or which draw down in certain, and
securities lent for which the bank is at risk. See Int'l
Finance, supra note 83 at 273.
Included within the 50%
conversion factor category are transaction-related
contigencies note issuance facilities and unused
commitments with and original maturity exceeding one year,
as well as, revolving underwriting facilities. See Gordon,
supra note 160 at 507.
the 20% conversion factor includes
short-term, self -liquidating, trade-related contingencies,
including commercial letters of credit. Id.
The 0%
conversion factor includes commitments that have a maturity
of less than one year or that can be unconditionally
canceled at any time. See Alford, supra note 169 at 200.
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 265-66.
,
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sum of risk-adjusted assets."

standards are not enforceable as

The Basle Accord capital
a

treaty.

Instead,

each

signatory country has committed to follow the guidelines in
good faith.

23:

The Basle Committee is working continuously
The Basle Committee

on the capital adequacy framework."
is also trying to

monitor international implementation and

to take account of the effects of accounting standards and

fiscal policy on this implementation.'"

Panama legislators view the integration of Basle

Accord standards into Panama banking law as possible and
compatible with Panama's quest for market advantages and
competitiveness."

such adoption would result in better

reputation, access to better rates and international

conditions.

Also it will improve Panama's economic image

with regard to other international regulatory entities.
In the bill for the modernization of the banking system,

legislators believe that an 8% capital ratio is adequate

234

supra note 219 at 561.
Tier 1 + Tier 2
risk-adjusted assets + off-balance sheet items
Although the Accord is not mandatory world wide,
countries that not adopt the Accord, in a short future, are
going to be out of the game. Id. at 201.
These framework only or primarily focus on credit risk.
Banks are exposed to a range of other forms of risk such as
rate risk, foreign exchange risk, position risk, and
settlement and operational risks.
Int'l Finance, supra
note 83 at 261.
See Calaby,

MINIMUM

237
238

=

Id.

The Bill,

supra note 218 at art.

39
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for Panama but that

higher percentage is not favorable

a

for banking market in Panama/ 3 '

The implementation of the

would also

3asle Accord capital standards in Panama

enhance Panama's international market position and

contribute to the improvement and expansion of the banking
and financial services offered by Panama's International

Financial Center. 240
All Basle Accord signatory banking institutions will
be subject to a specific and defined capital standard whose

main objective is to solidify confidence in the

international banking system." 41

Although banks not

subject to the Basle Accord guidelines,

domestic banks, have

a

such as U.S.

competitive advantage over banks

subject to the capital guidelines,"

in the future banks

not subject to the standards are going to-be excluded from
the international banking business.
2

.

Deposit Insurance
The prevention of another Great Depression,

banks which placed heavy costs on society,

run on

is the

fundamental goal of the U.S. banking system. 243

One of the

major concerns for the international banking community is

239
240
241
242
243

Id.

Agreement 4-81
Calaby,
Alford,
Lovett,

.

supra note 219 at 570
supra note 169 at 207
supra note 1 at 131.

.
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the panic likely to result from failures in the

international arena.
funds from

a

Obviously an individual can withdraw

bank at any time but if

a

numerous depositors

withdraw simultaneously, the bank is not going to have
sufficient funds to cover the demand.

This could result

in the failure of a normally solvent bank.
In the U.S.,

z44

the most important system for curtailing

banks runs and failures is the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation which sets "the pattern on insurance and risk
pooling for other institutions."^ 45

The Congressional

purpose underlying the creation of the FDIC was the

elaboration of

a

structure for "stabilizing or promoting

soundness of banking and to aid government in discharge of
46
its fiscal transactions.""

The most important function of the FDIC is to provide

federal deposit insurance to all national banks and

virtually all state chartered commercial banks, small
numbers of thrift institutions and virtually all the

nation's savings and loans banks. 247

The FDIC is in charge

of the inspection of the institution and the management of

44

Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 307-08.
Id. at 132.
"The FDIC is an instrumentality of the U.S.
with certain governmental privileges and with public moneys
constituting a part of its capital funds.
See 1 Bank and
245

Banking, § 26 4, 155 (1986)
1 Bank and Banking,
§ 26 4,156 (1996).
247
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 67.
246

.
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failed banks.

248

Another important power of the FDIC is

the right to terminate the insured status of a bank that
the corporation insured.

^'

In addition,

the FDIC has the

power to remove or to suspend any officer or director of an

insured bank. 251
The purpose of bank examination by the FDIC is to

prevent losses which would result in claims against the

insurance fund.

251

The safety and risk control elements

that the FDIC considers in granting insurance are the same

factors or elements that the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency uses in considering whether to grant a new

national bank charter/'

FDIC examination must determine

if a bank's "assets in excess of capital requirements are

adequate to enable it to meet all of its liabilities to

depositors and other creditors as shown by the books of the
248

Id. at 68.
The chief function of the FDIC is
deposits of all banks entitled to insurance under
to the extent provided for each depositor and the
function of the corporation is to act as receiver
insured banks which fail.
See Bank and Banking, §

156

to insure
the law,

second
for
26 ^ at

(1996)

"The FDIC is empowered o initiate ^cease and desist
proceedings' against the banks it insures or regulates."
Id. When the bank difficulties are caused by a single
individual and can not be controlled by the other officers
and directors, FDIC has the power to remove or to suspend
that "problem" individual. Portis, supra note 133 at 259.
"Although a bank examination by the FDIC may reveal
irregularities or fraud, such examinations, though they may
inure incidentally to the protection of the insurance
fund." First State Bank v. U.S., 599 F.2d 558 (3d
Cir.1979); see also Banks and Banking, § 26 H at 159.
252
See Chapter 3, section D(l)(a).

.
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bank." 25

Depositors in most U.S. banks are insured up to

$100,000.00 per account by the FDIC. 254
The need to monitor the financial condition of banks
is a strong interest of the federal government,

but the

The same

current insurance scheme is not risk-based.

insurance premium is charged to banks which engage in risky

activities and banks which engage in more conservative
activities.

2

The sharing of losses by the bank and its

shareholders is appropriate when failure is

a

result of

bank managerial mistakes or other controllable factors, but
when the failure is caused by ^systematic problems' beyond

253

12 U.S.C.A. § 1215 (a); see also Macey and Miller, supra
note 2 at 107
54
The original coverage was $2,500.00 per account but
Gordon at 513.
today accounts of $100,000.00 are insured.
"Deposit insurance protects the same depositor only up to a
single limit.
If the same depositor has four accounts of
$50,000.00 each in his or her own name, then the insurance
limit is only $ 100,000.00.
But if these accounts are for
different legal interests, one for himself and three
separate trust accounts for different people or
organization, then the 100,000.00 limit applies to each
account.
See Lovett, supra note 1 at 136-37.
"The risk-based capital system alone will not make up
for the deficiencies of the present insurance scheme, but
by requiring progressively more capital for more volatile
assets, the system helps to protect the insurance fund."
Gordon, supra note 160 at 514.

:
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control of the bank, the federal government should be

responsible for the loss." 56
As mentioned above,

the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation minimizes the possibility of banking runs and
failure by providing de facto insurance to creditors whose
Some of the alternatives

claims are normally uninsured."'
that the FDIC has when dealing with

a

failed bank or

a

bank

in danger of failing are the pay-off of insured depositors,

the provision of direct financial assistance to the bank,
or the arrangement of a purchase-and-assumption

transaction
B

.

258

Regulation of Foreign Banks

.

Capital market globalization daily challenges bank
In recent years,

regulators."

foreign banks have

"The protection of the insurance fund and the financial
condition of banks is possible if bank institutions
seriously consider a risk-based capital and insurance
policy requiring to those banks that undertake riskier
ventures a more prudent action by increasing required
capital and insurance costs." Id.
Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 313.
The most common alternative chosen by the FDIC is the
purchase-and-assumption transaction in which the "assets
and liabilities of the problem bank are transferred to an
acquiring bank." Id.
Duncan Alford, Basle Committee minimum standards
international regulatory response to the failure of BCCI,
26 Geo.

Wash.

[hereinafter

J.
D.

Int'l L.
Alford].

&

Econ.

241,

242

(1992)
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significantly expanded their market share in the U.S. 260
the bank business becomes more international but

Each year,

some nations still have a low level of regulation in

comparison with international banking markets." 01

The

regulation of foreign bank in the different nations is

The regulation of foreign banks entry into

complex scheme.
a

country'

s

a

banking system differs from country to country,

and depends upon the policies and objectives that each

country has toward both its banking industry and its
economy.

A less developed country,

'

like Panama, may

restrict or strongly regulate foreign banks entry to

protect its banks from competition that could threaten
their survival.''
country,

1

In contrast,

like the United Sates,

a

highly industrialized

with

a

strong banking

industry, may be more concern with regulation of foreign

banks equaling that of domestic banks to assure the safety
and soundness of its banking system.

260

„

In 191Qf 12 2 foreign banks had $90 billion in assets in
the United States.
By 1991, 294 foreign banks, with over
700 offices, had assets of $800 billion-nearly 25% of the
total amount of bank lending in the United States." Id. at
243.

261
262

263
264

Id.

Scoler,
Id.
Id.

supra note

3

at 44.

.

.
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The entry of a foreign bank into the U.S. banking

market is possible through diverse methods."

The typical

methods are the establishment of representative offices,
agencies,"

branches"

01

or bank subsidiaries/'

additional methods of entry into such

a

200

Two

competitive market

are commercial lending companies and Edge Act Corporation
or Agreement Corporations."

7

2o5

Deborah Burand, Regulation of foreign banks' entry into
the United States under the FBSEA: implementation and
implications, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1089, 1090-91
(1993) [hereinafter Burand]
266
"Representative office means any office of a foreign
bank which is located in any state and does not fall within
the definitions of branch, agency or subsidiary." See
Scoler, supra note 265 at 45.
"Agency means any office or any place of business of a
foreign bank located in any state of the U.S. or the
District of Columbia at which credit balances are
maintained, checks are paid, or money is lent, but at which
deposits may not be accepted from a citizen or resident of
the U.S."
Bank and Banking, Regulation of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 404-05
(1992) [hereinafter R.B.G]
"Domestic branch means any office or any place of
business of a foreign bank located in any state of the U.S.
on the District of Columbia that may accept domestic
deposits and deposits that are incidental to or for the
purpose of carrying out transactions in foreign countries."
Id.
"Branch of a foreign bank means an office or place of
business in the United States where deposits are received."
Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
"Subsidiary means an organization more than 50% of the
voting shares of which is held directly or indirectly, or
which is otherwise controlled or capable of being
controlled, by the investor or an affiliate of the investor
under any authority." R.B.G.
supra note 267 at 405.
Burand, supra note 265 at 1091.
"Edges, which are
federally chartered, and Agreement Corporation, which are
state chartered, may conduct only international banking and
financial activities. Id. at 1124.
'

,
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1.

The Basle Committee.
The Basle Committee is trying to create an effective,

common approach to international banking regulation but in

reality there is no international banking law. 271
Basle Committee efforts to keep

a

The

balance between the

systematic risk resulting from increased globalization in
the banking industry and the af f ordability of the

regulation of such risk by individual nations 4

'

is

reflected in the issuance of minimum standards for bank
supervision.

2

The Basle Committee and the creation of

its first agreement on bank supervision were the result of

the collapse of the Herstatt Bank in Germany in 1974.

4

^

The Committee has issued several guidelines for

international banking supervision having as their purpose
the "regular cooperation between its member

:71

272
273

Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 246.
Id.

"Due to its fraudulent bookkeeping practice, the
Herstatt bank failed and other German banks were unable to
bail it out.
Legal claims against the Herstatt bank were
eventually settled. Most of the international operations
of the bank were conducted at its head office in Germany
and, therefore, mainly domestic assets were involved.
Nevertheless, the resolution of the bank's failure. ..set a
negative precedent for the settlement of international
financial crises and demonstrated the need for greater

international regulation."

Id.

.
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countries on banking supervisory matters

."^
'

The Basle

Committee developed guidelines for the division of

responsibilities among national banking supervisory
authorities. 276

These guidelines, published in the Basle

Concordat, embodied the following principles:
(l)No foreign banking establishment should
escape supervision;
(2) the supervision of foreign banking
establishments is the joint responsibility of
host and parent authority;
(3) liquidity supervision is the responsibility of
the host authority;
solvency supervision is the responsibility of
4
the parent authority;
cooperation of supervision should be
facilitated by the exchange of information
between parent and host authorities, and indirect
examination of foreign branches by the parent
authority through the agency of host
277
4_u
authorities
(

)

The principles of the Concordat were tested by
the financial failure in 1982 of the Luxembourg

The following guidelines had been issued by the
Committee for international banking supervision:
The Basle
Concordat of 1975, the Revised Concordat of 1983 and the
Basle Accord (Capital Adequacy Standards)
Id. at 247.
These guidelines were published as the "Basle
Concordat". Calaby, supra note 219 at 556. "The Concordat
deals primarily with the liquidity, solvency, and foreign
exchange operations of foreign banks.
Under the Concordat
the host supervisory authority was responsible for
regulating liquidity, regardless of the type of banking
entity established in the host nation.
The supervisory
responsibility for solvency was allocated between host and
home regulators depending on the type of foreign banking
establishment involved; subsidiaries and joint ventures
were the responsibility of the host regulator, while
branches were the responsibility of the home regulator." D.
Alford, supra note 259 at 249.
277
Calaby, supra note 219 at 556-57.
.

s

74

subsidiary of the Banco Ambrosiano.'
this collapse was the issuiance of
the Concordat.

2

a

The response to

reformulation of

The purpose of this Revised

Concordat was to eliminate gaps the Concordat's

guidelines and to address "directly the adequacy of

supervision of foreign financial institutions."
The Revised Concordat introduced the

x

dual key'

approach and adopted the principle of consolidated
supervision.

The

'dual key'

supervision envisions

cooperation between the home and host supervisory
authorities in assessing the quality of each other'
supervision of an international bank. 281

The

international bank supervisors developed the principle

"The Banco Ambrosiano subsidiary in Luxembourg had made
$1.4 billion worth of imprudent loans to Latin American
companies.
As a result, the subsidiary owed nearly $450
million to its creditors.
Unable to pay its creditors, the
bank and its Luxembourg subsidiary collapsed in July 1982."
See D. Alford, supra note 259 at 251;
see also Ulrich
Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano collapse and the luxury of
National Lenders of Last Resort with international
responsibilities, 22 N. Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL, 181, 185-86
(1990) [hereinafter Hess]
The reformulation of the Concordat in May 1983 is well
known as the Revised Concordat.
280
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 252.
281
With the use of the dual key supervision the Committee
intent to avoid the tendency for jurisdictions to relax
controls in order to attract more foreign investment. Id.
at 252-53.

75

of consolidated supervision"

6

in which "the parent

regulator monitors the parent bank'

s

risk exposure and

capital adequacy based on all the operations of the
bank,

wherever conducted."'

supervision operates on

a

5

The Consolidated

national level requiring

coordination of regulatory and supervisory standards
and frequent communication between the host and home

country regulators.

284

As mentioned above,

the Basle Accord of 1988 was the

product of several years of negotiation among bank
regulators.

The Basle Committee issued risk-capital

standards for banking institutions with the intention of

improving safety and soundness in the banking systems and
to create competitive equality among international banks."
2

.

The International Banking Act of 1978

1

.

Foreign banks first established operations in the U.S.
in the 1800' s.

Their presence became

a

focus of United

States regulators in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
In 1966,

286

the Joint Economic Committee undertook the first

federal investigation of foreign bank activities in the

Joseph Norton, Trends in international bank supervision
and the Basle Committee on bank supervision, 48 Consumer
Fin. L.Q. Rep. 415, 416 (1994) [hereinafter J.Norton].
283
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 255.
284
J. Norton, supra note 282 at 416.
285
Alford, supra note 259 at 196.
286
Burar.
supra note 265 at 1089.
,

.

U.S.

and concluded that it was possible for

to gain

a

foreign bank

a

competitive advantage over federally regulated

domestic banks. 287

In essence,

United States

system allowed foreign banks to gain
over their domestic counterparts.

a

'

s

dual banking

competitive edge

288

The first substantial step towards regulating the

presence of foreign banks in U.S. was the enactment of the

International Banking Act of 1978.

289

Federal regulation of

foreign bank activities and formalization of

a

policy of

national treatment 290 more than reciprocity^ 91 were the

principal objectives of the IBA." 9

Under the IBA,

the

three federal bank regulatory agencies were able to

supervise and regulate foreign banks operating in the

By that time, foreign banks were regulated and
L. Tood
supervised by state regulatory authorities.
Gibson, Note, The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act
of 1991: short run consequences en route to the long term
goal, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 119 at 120-21
(1995) [hereinafter Gibson]
"By opting for state regulations the foreign banks
escaped federal restrictions." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
The foreign banks escaped federal regulation by not
establishing subsidiaries because it could establish
branches agencies under state laws. Id.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 122.
"National treatment allows entry of foreign banks on
regulatory basis comparable to that applied domestic banks
in the United States." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44; see Orr,
Reciprocity and regulation of entry, 111. L. Rev. 333-34
(1988) [hereinafter Orr]
"Reciprocity allows entry on a regulatory basis
comparable to that applied to U.S. banks in the foreign
bank's home country." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
292
Gibson, supra note 287 at 122.

.
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U.S.^ 9

The IBA offered foreign banks the options to

'

obtain

a

federal charter, to establish federal branches and

agencies and to subsequently submit to the immediate

supervision of the OCC

4
.

The IBA brought foreign banks

under the jurisdiction of the McFadden Act and the Bank

Holding Company Act which prohibit banks from branching

:9_j

Burand, supra note 265 at 1093
"The IBA seeks to eliminate the regulatory
Id.
advantages favoring foreign banking institutions at the
IBA introduce several major
expense of domestic banks.
changes in federal banking policy:
1. An option for federal licensing of foreign branches and
agencies as well as for subsidiaries.
2. Mandatory deposit insurance for foreign branches engaged
in retail banking.
3. Imposition of reserve requirements on foreign branches
and agencies.
4
Limitation on the further expansion of multistate
deposit taking activities.
5. Extension of the nonbanking prohibition of the BHC Act
to foreign banks operating branches, agencies, and
commercial lending companies.
6. Appointment of the Federal Reserve to act as the
residual examining agency in order to insure federal
regulation of existing multistates activities of foreign
banks
7
Removal of restrictions preventing foreign banks from
establishing Edge Corporations or acquiring a majority
interest therein.
Similarly, the IBA eliminates the
requirement that all directors of Edge Corporations be
294

American citizens."
See Nicholas Deak and JoAnne Celusak, International
Banking, New Yor Institute of Finance, 198 (1984).
[hereinafter Deak]

78

throughout the country."

The Federal Reserve System did

not have licensing authority regarding the establishment of

foreign banks branches and agencies in U.S.^

9(l

but it was

authorized to examine foreign banks' branches and agencies,
or "any U.S.

by

a

commercial lending company or bank controlled

foreign bank." 297

Under the IBA, United States

branches of foreign banks are required to apply for federal
deposit insurance for their retail deposits." 98
3.

The BCCI scandal in United States.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International

affair,

("BCCI")

the biggest financial scandal and fraud in banking

history, highlighted the supervisory deficiencies of the

295

Burand, supra note 265 at 1093.
"The IBA establishes
statutory federal jurisdiction over the U.S. operations of
foreign banks.
The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System regulates both the bank reserves and the
examination of branches and agencies of foreign banks.
Additionally, previous 'domestic only' laws and
regulations, such as the Bank Holding Company Act, were
made applicable to the non-banking activities of foreign
banks.
As such the Glass Steagall Act, which mandates the
separation of investment banking and commercial banking, is
applicable to foreign banks as well." See Scoler, supra
note 3 at 44-45.
296
Burand, supra note 265 at 1094.
297

Id.

"Accordingly, under the IBA, the FDIC also plays a role
in the supervision and regulation of insured branches of
foreign banks." Id. at 1095.

79

international banking

The Pakistani financier

system.'"'

Aga Hassan Abedi 300 founded BCCI in 1972 using Abu Dhabi

investors funds.

301

BCCI was incorporated through a bank

holding company in Luxembourg.
(Luxembourg)

S.A.

302

BCCI Holdings

had two principal subsidiaries: The Bank

of Credit and Commerce International S.A.,

incorporated in

Luxembourg, and The Bank of Credit and Commerce

International
Islands.

3
'

(Overseas)

Ltd.,

incorporated in Cayman

The significant point of these organizational

arrangements was that while not conducting business there,
BCCI's holding company and its major subsidiary were

chartered in counties in whose regulator authorities were

99

Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
"BCCI was a case of
widespread institutional fraud on a global scale (involving
at least 19 jurisdictions) and brought into question the
ability of the domestic regulation of international banks
to control such transborder fraud." See J. Norton, supra
note 282 at 415.
The founder and president of BCCI, Agha Hassan Abedi was
not a man who liked banking laws or banking regulators.
See Raj K. Bhala, Foreign bank regulation after BCCI, North
Carolina, 13, 1994 [hereinafter Bhala]
101
Edwards, supra note 5 1267
302

Id.

at 1268.

Alford, supra note 259 at 262. The BCCI Holdings were
BCCI S.A., with 46 offices in 12 countries and two agencies
in U.S.; BCCI Overseas, with 62 offices in 28 countries
(two in Panama), and Other BCCI Subsidiaries, with 26
consolodated subsidiearies
See Bhala, supra note 300 at
xvii
D.

.

.

.

.
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not required to monitor BCCI's global activities.
In 1982,

after several years of the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC)
purchase,

3

304

rejection to approve the

BCCI successfully gain control of Financial

General Bankshares in Washington and renamed it as First

American Bankshares

j3
'

First American's Chairman,

former

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, assured the U.S.
government that BCCI was not involved with the First

American Bank, but in reality BCCI had actually acquired
the bank through "front" involving Middle Eastern investor
loans.

3
'

Through First American, BCCI was able to acquire

illegally the Independence Bank of Encino, California, the
National Bank of Georgia, Cen-Trust Savings Bank, and
Credit and Commerce American Holdings

(CCAH)

parent company of First American Bankshares
In 1988,

,

which was the

3Ci

the Federal Reserve indicted BCCI for money

laundering in the United States.

This started

coordinated investigation of BCCI. In 1991,

a

a

Price

Waterhouse report inform detailed BCCI's massive fraud.

,04

3

'

Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
"The SEC requires foreign banks to disclose details
about their operations if they plan to own more than five
percent of the outstanding shares in an American holding
company.
BCCI tried to avoid these disclosures by working
with several parties to buy the stock." Id.
306
Edward, supra note 5 at 1268.
307
Id. at 1269.
308
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 260.
309
Edwards, supra note 5 at 1270.

a

a
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The importance of multinational banks in a global

economy and its supervision is demonstrated by the failure
of the BCCI.

310

The two basic lessons that emerge with this

scandal were that BCCI operated without having

home

a

country regulator monitoring its operations and BCCI

"recordkeeping practices were undetected because of the
lack of uniform regulatory standards." 311
home country supervision,

With regard to

BCCI demonstrates that it is only

relevant when that jurisdiction has "[

1

]

comparable

supervisory standards to that host jurisdiction

,

[2]

capacity to implement and enforce such standards, and

[3]

deposit insurance and lender of last resort dimension."

3

'

The lack of uniform regulatory standards allowed BCCI "to

shift losses from its records in one country to that of

another country without raising any concerns on the part of

regulators about the bank's solvency." 313
The Basle Committee's response to the BCCI scandal was
the formulation of new minimum standards.

314

The new

minimum standards rest upon the principles that:
(1) all international banks and banking groups
should be supervised by a "home country"
regulator; (2) an international bank should
310
311
312

Id.
Id.

at 1273

J. Norton, supra note 282 at 416.
Edwards, supra note 5 at 1277.
314
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 267.
The Committee
reformulated the principles reflected in the Basle
Concordat and the Revised Concordat.
313

82

obtain the permission of both the host: and home
regulators before opening a branch or other
banking establishment in a foreign nation; (3)
banking regulators should have the right to
gather information from international banks; (4)
if the minimum standards are not met, a host
regulator may impose restrictive measures against
the international bank; and (5) information
exchanges between regulators in different nations
should continue to be encouraged. 315
4.

The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act.

Scandals involving foreign banks operating in the

United States have prompted regulators to realize that the
growth of foreign bank activities in the United States,

316

poses significant dangers because banks may act

"deliberately and fraudulently, exploting weaknesses in the
international supervision of international banking

operations." 317

Consequently, Congress enacted the Foreign

Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991

315

316

Id.

(FBSEA),

318

as part

at 267.

supra note 265 at 1097.
"The BCCI and the Banca
Nazionale de Lavoro incidents highlighted for Congress the
gaps in the existing regulatory regime." Gibson, supra note
Burand,

287 at 126.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 143.
"The BCCI engaged in
extensive money laundering and fraud.
The Banca Nazionale
de Lavoro made close to $3 billion in illegal loans to
Iraq, which went to finance weapon sales in conflict with
U.S. policy." Id.
318
12 U.S.C.A. § 3101-3111 (Supp. IV 1992).
See Scoler,
supra note 3 at 45.

83

of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement

Act of 1991.

319

The FBSEA was enacted in the same form as proposed by
the Federal Reserve,

but it differs from the Federal

Reserve proposal in some areas.

320

Prior to the FBSEA,

individual state banking regulators supervised foreign
banks in the United States, but under the FBSEA,

the

Federal Reserve must approve the entry of foreign banks
into the U.S. banking business.

321

The Foreign Banks Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991

creates four primary provisions that change the existing

regulatory regime.

3.

First,

all foreign banks seeking to

establish federal or state licensed branches or agencies 3

'

to operate in the United States must receive Federal

Reserve approval to enter the country.
319

24

Under the FBSEA,

D. Alford, supra note 259 at 279.
"The FDICIA was
enacted with the purpose to reform the financial services
industry and the federal deposit insurance system in the
U.S.
the FDICIA provided additional resources to the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) and strengthened supervision and
examination of federally insured institutions." Gibson,
supra note 287 at 126-27.
20
Burand, supra note 265 at 1101.
321
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 279.
"The standards for
approval for representative offices, branches, agencies and
subsidiaries of foreign banks are now enumerated in the
FBSEA of 1991." Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 129.
Burand, supra note 265 at 1101.
The Fed intends to ensure that only adequately
capitalized and properly supervised non-U. S. banking
organizations are permitted to enter onto the U.S. market.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 129.
4

84

consolidated supervision standards were established"''

which

foreign banks must comply with to enter the United
States.

3

These standards assume that:(l)

'

"the foreign bank

engages directly in the business of banking outside the
U.S.";

3

7

''

(2)

"the foreign bank is subject to comprehensive

supervision in its home country";

3

and

'

(3)

"the foreign

bank has furnished to the Board the information it needs to

adequately assess the application." 3

'

The Fed considers

five factors to determine whether a specific applicant's

home country supervisor provides comprehensive consolidated

supervision in
(1)

(2

325

326

3

a

l

)

a

particular case:

ensuring that individual banks which they
oversee have adequate procedures for
monitoring and controlling domestic and
international activities;
collecting regular reports (e.g. audits) on
the condition of the parent bank, and the
subsidiaries and office outside the home
country;

Scoler,
Gibson,
Scoler,

supra note 3 at 45.
supra note 287 at 130.
supra note 3 at 45.

Id.

Gibson, supra note 287 at 130.
"In order to obtain
Federal Reserve Board approval, a foreign bank wishing to
open an establishment in the United States must show that
it is subject to ^comprehensive supervision or regulation
on a consolidated basis' by its home regulator.
If it
wishes to establish a branch or agency in the U.S., the
foreign bank also must make adequate assurances that it
will provide the Federal Reserve Board whatever information
the FRB deems necessary for its supervision of the foreign
bank.
The FRB thus will be concerned about other nations'
bank secrecy laws that may prevent it from obtaining
sufficient information on the parent bank." D. Alford,
supra note 259 at 279-80.

85
(3)

(4

)

5

)

(

collecting information regarding the
relationship between the parent bank and its
foreign and domestic affiliates;
collecting financial reports that are
consolidated on a worldwide basis; and
evaluating prudential standards (e.g. capital
adequacy) on a worldwide basis.
3

There are four additional discretionary standards

associated with entry approval into the U.S.:
country authorities must consent to the bank'
U.S.

expansion;

(2)

(1)
s

the home

proposed

the financial and managerial resources

of the foreign bank must appear adequate;

(3)

the provision

of all the information required by the Fed must be

provided; and

(4)

the compliance by the foreign bank must

comply with all applicable United States laws.

331

The second provision enacted by the FBSEA focuses on
the termination of foreign bank offices operations.

provides that the Fed may terminate the operations of
state chartered foreign bank office,

3

It
a

when the Board finds

that the home country no longer meets proper standards of

comprehensive supervision.

3

The FBSEA also gives the Fed

the power to recommend to the OCC the termination of the

operations of

a

federally chartered foreign bank office.

334

This recommendation may be made if the foreign bank office

332

!34

Gibson,
Scoler,
Gibson,
Scoler,
Gibson,

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note 287 at 131.
note 3 at 45.
note 287 at 132.
note 3 at 46.
note 287 at 132.

.

36
is "not subject to

supervision"'

comprehensive consolidated home county

and "the bank has engaged in unsound and

unsafe banking practices." 3 36
'

The third provision restricts the latitude of foreign

banks to take deposits.

Acceptance of deposits of less

than $100,000.00 is allowed only for foreign banks that

have an insured U.S. subsidiary.

3

Foreign banks may not

established new insured retail branches

,

but "branches

existing prior to the FBSEA are grandfathered provided that
they continue to operate in compliance with section
IBA." 338

6

of

Uninsured deposits of less than $100,000.00 are

acceptable if they are wholesale deposits.

339

The four provision authorizes Federal Reserve

examination of foreign bank state licensed branches and
^„„„„; «,„
agencies

335

336
337

340

Id.
D.

Id.

Alford,

supra note 259 at 280.

at 281.

338

Gibson, supra note 287 at 133.
See 12 U.S.C.A. §
3104 (c) (2) (Supp. IV 1992)
39
Gibson, supra note 287 at 133.
340
Id.
The FBSEA makes changes in the regulation of
foreign banks in U.S. Federal Reserve Board is the primary
regulator of foreign banks in U.S.
The dual banking system
regulation is not applicable to foreign banks.
Foreign
banks must obtain a state banking license and the prior
approval of the Federal Reserve Board if want to enter in
U.S. banking business.
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 280.
.

.
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Congress enacted the Interstate Banking and

In 1994,

Branching Efficiency Act

authorizing interstate

(IBBEA),

Three type of branching are permitted:

branching.

bank holding company [is] permitted to
acquire banks in another state and subsequently
Second, a bank [may]
convert them to branches.
merge with an out of state bank and ~hen convert
Finally, [branching] may
the latter to a branch.
be achieved by de novo establishment of direct
branches 341
First,

a

.

IBBEA'

s

section 104 authorizes foreign bank

establishment and operation of
agency or

a

a

Federal branch or Federal

State branch or state agency in any state

outside the foreign bank's home state if "(A)

the

establishment and operation of branch or agency is

expressly permitted by the State in which the branch or
agency is to be established" 34

"'

and

"(B)

in the case of a

Federal or State branch, the branch receives only such

deposits as would be permissible for corporation organized
under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act." 343

Section 107 offers equal competitive opportunities to
foreign and U.S. banking institutions if the OCC and the

341

Charles Hultman, Foreign Banks and the U.S. Regulatory
Environment, 114 The Banking Journal, 457,
(1997) [hereinafter Hultman]

342
343

Id.
Id.

at 458.

.

.

:.

FDIC ensure that foreign banks do not receive an unfair

competitive advantage over U.S. banks.
5

44

The Federal Reserve Board as regulator of foreign

.

banks

.

The Federal Reserve System is one of the three federal

regulators of banks in the United States.

345

The Federal

Reserve is the regulator of bank holding companies and of

state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System.

346

Under several statutory provisions

foreign banks, which want to engage in the banking business
in the U.S.,

are also closely supervised by the Federal

Reserve System.

347

Pursuant to these provisions,

the

Federal Reserve established the following guidelines for
the examination of foreign banks organizations
(1)

344

348

An annual safety and soundness examination of the

foreign bank, unless "the
a

(FBO)

condition of the branch suggests

need for more regular assessments." 349

Id.

David Holland, Foreign bank capital and the United
States Federal Reserve Board, 20 Int'l Law. 785, 786
(1986) [hereinafter Holland]
346
347

Id.
Id.

348

"The manual provides supervisory agencies
in evaluating branches in the context of the
Bank Organization."
See Marvin Tubbs II,
Banking— Foreign Banks Operating in the U.S.,
Banking L. 161 (1996) [hereinafter Tubbs]
349

Id.

with guidance
entire Foreign
International
15 Ann.

Rev.

s

89
(2)

The examination findings must be integrated into

'summary of condition'

for

foreign bank

each

a

"in

order to provide insights into the particular strengths and

weaknesses of the foreign bank in U.S. operations." 3 "
(3)

In the preparation of the summary of conditions the Fed

will examine all elements of the ROCA rating system.

When the summary is completed the Fed may assign

combination of ratings between

I

to

5

3

a

to determine the

range of the foreign bank's U.S. operations.

350
l51

Id.
Id.

at

162.

The ROCA system focuses on risk management,
The
operational controls, compliance and asset quality.
ROCA system focused on the foreign bank history compliance
with federal and state law and on the ability of foreign
banks to manage its risk assets. Id at 164.
"A combined rating
of 1 indicates the existence of a
fundamentally sound FBO requiring no extra supervisory
attention.
The Fed assigns a combined rating of 2 to those
FBOs it considers basically sound yet still possess some
modest, easily correctable, deficiencies requiring no more
than normal supervision.
A combined rating of 3 suggests
regulatory concern warranting greater supervision.
The Fed
may also assign a rating 3 where risk management,
operational controls or compliance are by themselves viewed
as an unsatisfactory means of correcting the branch'
deficiencies.
A combined rating of 4 indicates the
existence of serious weaknesses within the FBO which create
unsafe and unsound banking practices requiring close
supervisory attention, surveillance, and the implementation
of a corrective plan.
A FBO determined to be so unsafe and
unsound that it requires immediate restructuring will
receive a rating of 5."
Id. at 162.

.

90

(4)

The Fed also conducts

a

strength of support assessment

that "enables the Fed to better evaluate

support its U.S.
Recently,

a

FBO'

ability to

s

operations.'^'

the Federal Reserve Board of Governors

issued the final revisions to Regulation

international banking operations.

354

K,

which regulates

The revision

established that foreign banks have the authorization "tc
open offices in U.S. through prior notice procedures,

eliminating the need for qualifying banks to file
application with the Fed."

3

However,

"

there is

a

formal

a

reciprocity provision which precludes foreign banks from

managing activities that could not be managed by
bank at its foreign branches or subsidiaries.

a

U.S.

356

There are also some U.S. policies and procedures that
a

foreign bank must follow to satisfy the Federal Reserve

requirements.

The factors

a

FBO should consider to improve

The two components of the assessment are the analysis of
the capability of a FBO to meet its U.S. obligations and
the identification of internal control risks apparent
within the bank regardless of its financial stability.
Id.
at 163.

Anjali Kumar, International Banking— Foreign Banks
operating in the United Sates, 16 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 144
(1997) [hereinafter Kumar]
355

Id.

"The prohibition applies to offshore branches managed or
controlled by a foreign bank's U.S> branches or agencies."
Id.

at

145.

91

its efficiency and its relationship with U.S.

are

regulators

:

Adopt comprehensive, uniform policies, procedures
and management information systems that cover all
U.S. offices; [c]oordinate this effort with the
head office in the foreign bank' s home country,
where business practices and regulatory
expectations sometimes are different; [e]stablish
a regional administrative office to consolidate
administrative functions; this should help
eliminate duplication and maximize the potential
for risk identification and control; [a]ssign an
individual or a group at the administrative
office to track regulatory developments and
ensure steps are taken to comply with regulatory
requirements 357
.

6

.

Regulation of foreign banks in Panama

.

Under the Bill for the Modernization of the Banking

System only Panamanian banks with 51% of Panamanian
capital,

and subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks can

undertake banking activities in Panama.
a

foreign bank wishes to establish

Panama,

a

35 8
'

Consequently,

banking office in

is only possible through a subsidiary or branch.

Carol Beaumier, Uniform foreign bank policies and
procedures would please U.S. regulators, 12 NO 4 Banking
Pol'y Rep. 4 (1993)
hereinafter Beaumier].
35 8
Asociacion Panameha de Bancos, Banca & Mercadc 3
(1997) [hereinafter B&M]
.

[

,

if

92

Consequently,
a

a

foreign entity can not establish in Panama

bank independent of

a

parent bank in its home country.

359

This policy is viewed as strengthening the Panama Financial

Center as well as charging home country regulators with the

supervision of its branches and subsidiaries on

consolidated supervision basis.

359
360

Id.
Id.

at

4

3

'

a

.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The worldwide banking business has undergone important

1.

changes in its structure and regulation, and is currently
in a stage of continuing development and expansion.

The objectives of bank regulation is to avoid

2.

monopolies in the domestic and international arena, and to

minimize the risk of banks becoming insolvent and to
protect depositors if failures occur.

361

Every country regulates their banking activities in

3.

accordance with the community necessities and its economic
requirements
4

It is difficult to make every country follow a

.

specific international regulation but if every nation has
common regulatory starting point, the regulatory gaps can
be eliminated.
5.

The two major components of banking regulation in the

U.S.

and Panama are the regulation of banks and bank

holding companies.
6.

i61

The changes suffered in the last decades by the

Edwards,

supra note

5

at 1277

93

a

94

banking system are affecting the dual banking system.
is reflected

:he

:.r

evolution of state and federal

chartered banks in the
7.

This

Total supervisi

90' s.

/stem is the main

n

objective of the Basle Accord.

Nations need its

coordinating power to properly to supervise their banks
with operations beyond their home country.
8.

Regulators of host countries

'

must pay attention to

the regulation and supervision of the bank's activities in

their home countries.
9.

Terms such as "capital adequacy" and "consolidated

supervision" serve as "code words" for enhanced and

broadened bank supervision on both the international and
domestic level.
10.

3

3

The international banking supervision standards under

the Basle Accord have had

a

profound impact upon the U.S.

regulations, mainly in its risk-based capital adequacy and

capital-based supervisory schemes.
11.

Capital adequacy is

a

364

very important element to

procure the safety and soundness of the banking system but
it is not the only one.

363
364

There are other elements, eg.,

This is the specific case of Panama
J.Norton, supra note 282 at 415.
Id.

at 419.

.

95

funding and market risks; the quality and level

liquidity;

of earnings;

the effectiveness of loan and investment

policies; and the overall ability of management to monitor
other financial risks,

achieve
12.

a

365

that should be considered to

better regulatory structure.

International regulators will continue to review the

capital standards and regulatory scheme in general to
fulfill the international banking community's requirements.
Panama has to embrace regulatory revisions to be at the
same level that other financial centers.
13.

The regulation of foreign banks,

basically the IBA,

the FBSEA and the Basle Accord implementations in U.S.,

will serve as an example for less development countries

with regard to standards used to evaluate the entry of

foreign banks within national boundaries.
14.

The adoption by Panama of the Basle Accord Standards

will require changes in Panama's strategies and regulatory

policies in order to comply with the more stringent capital
requirement
15.

Experience using these standards will tell us if it

works and what possible changes regulators should make to

improve Panama's banking and financial system.

Gordon,

supra note 160 at 519.
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